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i. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206 r Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL L i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C) hardware.
The EPD&C hardware performs the functions of distributing,
sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting,
distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power
to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the
Electrical P0wer Generation (EPG) subsystem. The EPD&C subsystem
hardware components were grouped and analyzed according to their
physical location in their hardware assemblies, as follows:
o Main DC Distribution Assemblies (MDDA) 1, 2, and 3
o Mid Power Control Assemblies (MPCA) 1, 2, and 3
o Mid Motor Control Assemblies (MMCA) i, 2, 3, and 4
o Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA) 4, 5, and 6
o Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA) 1, 2, and 3
o Aft Load Control Assemblies (ALCA) 1, 2, and 3
o Aft Motor Control Assemblies (AMCA) i_2, and 3
o Forward Power Control Assemblies (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3
o Forward Load Control Assemblies (FLCA) 1, 2, and 3
o Forward Motor Control Assemblies (FMCA) 1, 2, and 3
o AC Generation & Distribution Assemblies (AGDA)
i, 2, and 3
o Flight Deck Panel Controls & Displays (FDPC&D)
o Mid Deck Panel Controls & Displays (MDPC&D)
o Master EventControllers, Annunciator Control
Assemblies, and Current Sensors (MISC)
The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD&C hardware draw-
ings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components,
and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
w
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Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure cr_ticalities for each
of the fourteen subdivisions of the EPD&C. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second. _..........
+--mm_|Immmmm!mm!immmmm||mmmmmmmmmmmm!
I Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/?) I
I _m_mnnm_imiUnilli_Uui u w
] Criticality : I i/I ] 2/iRI 2/2 I 3/IRI 3/2Rf 3/3 ] TOTAL I
I I I I I I I i I
I Number : i 12 I 136 I - I_ 478:_: 69 I 976 I 167i i
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
_ m m m m mintmm, lmm •m Im m ,m e mm,mmm mm
J Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
I -
(HW/F)
I Criticality : I 1/1 I 2/IRI 2/2 ] 3/1RI 3/2RI TOTAL I
I I I I i i I i
I Number : I 12 I 136 I - I 292 I 28 I 468 i _
Of the one thousand six hundred seventy-one (1671) failure modes
analyzed, nine (9) single failures were determined to result in
loss of crew or vehicle. Three (3) single failures unique to
intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of one hundred thirty-six (136) single failures occurred. Six
(6) of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two
pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket
Booster separation. TJ!e other six (6) criticality 1/1 failures
are fuses, one-_-ac_h per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5,
and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) i,
2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System
(MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.
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Figure 1 - EPD&C OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident pr0mpted the NASA_oreaddress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
office has undertakenthe task of reevaiuating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and Criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 EPD&C Ground Rules and Assumptions
The EPD&C ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
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3 •0 SUBS¥S_ DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C subsystem starts at the outputs of the three fuel cells
in the EPG subsystem and ends at the using subsystems. DC power
from each fuel cell is routed through two wires to one of three
main and one of three essentia! busses. Each main bus can be
tied to either of the other two main busses through power
contactors and each essential bus is also connected to the other
two main busses through diodes and Remote Power Controllers
(RPCs). Nine control busses are connected to the three main
busses through diodes and RPCs with each control bus receiving
power from two main busses. A control bus can be connected to
the remaining main bus when the appropriate circuit breaker is
closed. Each one of three Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem/Reaction
Control Subsystem (OMS/RCS) DC busses are powered by two of three
main busses through RPCs and diodes. Three DC busses to the
payload (Payload Cabin, Payload Aux, and Payload Emergency
busses) are powered through RPCs and diodes from Main DC Busses A
and B. Larger payload DC loads are powered through power
contactors from Main DC busses B and C and Fuel Cell #3.
AC power is generated by connecting each main DC bus to three of
nine single-phase invertors, resulting in three three-phase AC
busses. The three AC busses are connected to various loads
through circuit breakers. These AC busses are further connected
to three RCS/OMS AC busses, three Payload Bay Door (PLBD) AC
busses, and three Payload Bay Mechanical (PLBM) AC busses.
3.2 Assemblies Description
The EPD&C hardware performs the functions of distributing,
sensing, and controlling DC power and inverting, distributing,
sensing, and controlling AC power throughout the Orbiter. The
EPD&C subsystem is broken down and described by the following
fourteen assembly types:
I. Three (3) Main DC Distribution Assemblies (MDDAs) connect
the fuel cell outputs through power contactors to the three
main DC busses and through diodes and fuses via Panel RIAI
to the three essential busses. Power contactors on the
MDDAs allow tying the main busses together. Bus voltage
and current levels can be measured directly on Panel F9A2
meters or observed indirectly via General Purpose Computer
(GPC) output display via signal conditioners and
Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs). Main and essential DC
bus power is connected through fuses to the other
assemblies in the system.
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Three (3) Mid Power Control Assemblies (MPCAs) contain RPCs
to connect main DC bus power to MMCAs, Payload busses
(Cabin, Aux, and Emergency), and to essential busses. There
are also RPCs which connect Pre-Flight Test Busses to MDDAs
which allow Ground Support Equipment (GSE) control and
monitor of fuel cells and main DC bus ties.
•
Four (4) Mid Motor Control Assemblies (MMCAs) contain relays
to connect the three PLBM and three PLBD AC busses to the
three main AC busses• DC power is also routed to the
Payload Bay motors and relays•
I0.
Three (3) Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA-4, APCA-5, and
APCA-6) contain RPCs that connect power to the three RCS/OMS
DC busses, AMCAs, essential busses, and control GSE power to
the MMDAs. GSE power is distributed from these assemblies
through power contactors. DC power is also routed through
fused connections to the ALCAs and the other three APCAs.
ii.
Three (3) Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA-1, APCA-2, and
APCA-3) contain RPCs that power Master Event Controllers #i
and #2. Fused DC power to the Payload Bay is routed through
these assemblies also.
Three (3) Aft Load Control Assemblies (ALCAs) connect Main
DC Bus power to various subsystems. They also contain
Hybrid Device Controllers to connect GSE power to the
essential busses.
Three (3) Aft Motor Control Assemblies (AMCAs) connect Main
DC Bus power through diodes to the three RCS/OMS DC busses.
They also contain the origin of the RCS/OMS AC busses•
Three (3) Forward Power Control Assemblies (FPCAs) contain
the circuitry to connect the three main DC busses to the
nine control busses. DC power is provided to the AC
inverters through fuses and latching relays, RPCs are used
to control DC power to FMCAs and fused DC power is provided
to the FLCAs.
Three (3) Forward Load Control Assemblies (FLCAs) contain
Hybrid Device Controllers to control the nine AC inverters
and to allow GSE control of the same inverters.
Three (3) Forward Motor Control Assemblies (FMCAs) route AC
and DC power to various subsystems.
Three (3) AC Generation & Distribution Assemblies (AGDAs)
provide control and power circuits to the nine AC inverters.
Over/under voltage sensors allow inverters to be monitored
and disconnected from the AC Bus system.
7
I12. The Fligh£ Deck Panel Controis and Displays (FDPC&D) perform
the switching and certain monitoring functions for the
routing of power to all subsystems. These panels include
L4, RI3, RI5, R1, R2, 013, 014, 015, 016, 017, 019, F9, FI,
F6, C3, All, AI2, AIS, and A6, ....
13. The Mid Deck Panel Controls and Displays (MDPC&D) perform
the switchfng and monitoring functions for power tO the
inverters and various subsystems. These panels include
M030F, M052J, M013Q, and MA73C.
14. The Master Event Controllers #1 and #2, certain channels in
the Annunciator Control Assemblies, and Current Sensors are
grouped in this last category for convenience.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the EPD&C hardware and the
corresponding subassemblies.
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Figure 2 - EPD&C SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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g4 •0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the fourteen major sub-
divisions of the EPD&C. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality-.
MDDA
MPCA
MMCA
APCA (4- 6 )
APCA (1-3)
ALCA
AMCA
FPCA
FLCA
FMCA
AGDA
FDPC&D
MDPC&D
MISC
TOTAL
1/1
3
3
6
12
2/IR
21
8
26
9
m
m
3
23
42
4
136
2/2 3/IR
90
17
26
9
32
12
12
72
18
m
57
114
15
4
478
3/2R
14
24
4
2
w
16
9
69
3/3
74
ii0
59
38
25
123
192
138
139
63
15
976
TOTAL
199
159
52
8O
74
39
12
201
210
195
298
129
23
1671
Of the one thousand six hundred seventy-one (1671) failure modes
analyzed, nine (9) single failures were determined to result in
loss of crew or vehicle. Three (3) single failures unique to
intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of one hundred thirty-six single failures occurred. A summary of
the potential critical items is presented in Table II. Appendix
D presents a cross reference between each potential critical item
(PCI) and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE iI Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
MDDA
MPCA
MMCA
APCA (4-6)
APCA (1-3)
ALCA
AMCA
FPCA
FLCA
FMCA
AGDA
FDPC&D
MDPC&D
MISC
i/1
3
3
6
2/IR
21
8
26
9
3
23
42
4
2/2 1 3/1R
I
- I 77
- I 1
- I 14
- I 9
- I 24
- I 12
- I 12
- I Sl
- ! 9
- I 18
- I s9
- I 6
I
3/2R
8
12
E
2
2
4
TOTAL
106
21
4O
21
26
14
12
57
9
18
92
48
4
TOTAL I 12 I 136 I - I 292 I 28 I 468 I
4.1 Analysis Results - Main DC Distribution Assemblies
There are one hundred ninety-nine (199) failure modes identified
for the three MDDAs. Of these, twenty-one (21) are criticality
2/1R, ninety (90) are criticality 3/1R, fourteen (14) are
criticality 3/2R, and seventy-four (74) are criticality 3/3. One
hundred six (106) failures are identified as Potential Critical
Items (PCIs). These failures are listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results - Mid Power Control Assemblies
There are one hundred fifty-nine (159) failure modes identified
for the three MPCAs. Of these, eight (8) are criticality 2/1R,
seventeen (17) are criticality 3/1R, twenty-four (24) are
criticality 3/2R, and one hundred ten (110) are criticality 3/3.
Twenty-one (21) failures are identified as PCIs. These failures
are listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Analysis Results - Mid Motor Control Assemblies
There are fifty-two (52) failure modes identified for the four
MMCAs. Of these, twenty-six (26) are criticality 2/IR and
twenty-six (26) are criticality 3/1R. Forty (40) failures are
identified as PCIs. These failures are listed in Appendix D.
L_
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4.4 Analysis Results - Aft Power Control Assemblies 4, 5, and 6
There are eighty (80) failure modes identified for these three
APCAs. Of these, three (3) are identified as criticality 1/1,
nine (9) are criticality 2/1R, nine (9) are criticality 3/1R, and
fifty-nine (59) are criticality 3/3. Twenty-one (21) failures
are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix D. The three
criticality i/I failures are fuses, one per APCA, that supply
power to critical MPS valves.
4.5 Analysis Results - Aft Power Control Assemblies I, 2, and 3
There are seventy-four (74) failure modes identified for these
three APCAs. Of these, thirty-two (32) are criticality 3/1R,
four (4) are criticality 3/2R, and thirty-eight (38) are
criticality 3/3. Twenty-six (26) failures are identified as PCIs
and are listed in Appendix D.
4.6 Analysis Results - Aft Load Control Assemblies
There are thirty-nine (39) failure modes identified for the
ALCAs. Of these, twelve (12) are criticality 3/1R, two (2) are
criticality 3/2R, and twenty-five (25) are criticality 3/3.
Fourteen (14) failures are identified as PCIs and are listed in
Appendix D.
4.7 Analysis Results - Aft Motor Control Assemblies
There are twelve (12) failure modes identified for the AMCAs.
They are all criticality 3/1R and PCIs. They are listed in
Appendix D.
4.8 AnalysisResults - F0rward _Power_ontrol '_semblies _
There are two hundred one (201) failure modes identified for the
FPCAs. Of these, three (3) are criticality 1/1, three (3) are
criticality 2/1R, seventy-two (72) are criticality 3/1R, and one
hundred twenty-three (123) are criticality 3/3. Fifty-seven (57)
failures are Identified as PCis and are listed in Appendix D.
The three criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one per FPCA, that
supply power to the forward RCS and are only criticality 1/1
during an intact ABORT. During normal flight these failures are
criticality 3/1R.
4.9 Analysis Results - Forward Load Control Assemblies
There are two hundred ten (210) failure modes identified for the
FLCAs. Of these, eighteen (18) are criticality 3/1R and one
hundred ninety-two (192) are criticality 3/3. Nine (9) failures
are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix D.
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4.10 Analysis Results - Forward Motor Control Assemblies
There are no failure modes identified for the FMCAs.
4.11 Analysis Results - AC Generation & Distribution Assemblies
There are one hundred ninety-five (195) failure modes identified
for the AGDAs. Of these, fifty-seven (57) are criticality 3/1R
and one hundred thirty-eight (138) are criticality 3/3. Eighteen
(18) failures are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix
D.
4.12 Analysis Results - Flight Deck Panel Controls & Displays
There are two hundred ninety-eight (298) failure modes identified
for the FDPC&D. Of these, six (6) are criticality 1/1, twenty-
three (23) are criticality 2/1R, one hundred fourteen (114) are
criticality 3/1R, sixteen (16) are criticality 3/2R, and one
hundred thirty-nine (139) are criticality 3/3. Ninety-two (92)
failure modes are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix
D. The six (6) criticality 1/1 failures are switches that
control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation.
4.13 Analysis Results - Mid Deck Panel Controls & Displays
There are one hundred twenty-nine (129) failure modes identified
for the MDPC&D. Of these, forty-two (42) are criticality 2/1R,
fifteen (15) are criticality 3/1R, nine (9) are criticality 3/2R,
and sixty-three (63) are criticality 3/3. Forty-eight (48)
failures are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix D.
4.14 Analysis Results - MECs, ACAs, and Current Sensors
There are twenty-three (23) failure modes identified for the
MISC group. Of these, four (4) are criticality 2/1R, four (4)
are criticality 3/1R and fifteen (15) are criticality 3/3. Four
(4) failures are identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix D.
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AOA
ATO
CIL
CRIT
CWS
ECLSS
EPDC
EPG
FC
FCP
FMEA
FSSR
GAS
GPC
GSE
HDC
IOA
MDAC
MDM
NA
NASA
NSTS
OF
OMRSD
PCA
PCI
PLS
PRCB
PRSDS
PSA
RCS
RI
RPC
RTLS
STS
TAL
TCS
WRS
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Critical Items List
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Environmental Control and Life Support System
(Subsystem)
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- Fuel Cell
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
-Get-Away Special
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Forward
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Primary Landing Site
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Reaction Control System
- Rockwell International
- Remote Power Controller
- Return-to-Landing Site
- Space Transportation System
- TransatlanticAbort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Water Removal Subsystem
m
m
A-I
mI
.? m[]
|
m
I
M
m
I
m
i
i
B
m
I
R
I
B
I
m
U
m
U
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
n
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL t lO October 1986, were used with the following
_plifications and additl_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of theabort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of m--ission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
m
[]
[]
m
mm
g
I
mm
I
D
B
ms
ms
==
I
mmm
=
m
mm
B-2
i
mw
w
u
i
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the fai!_ure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to missiS-objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transl_-----_io--nout of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CILL 10 October was. 1986, employed--with the
following amplifications and addltion-_.
io
o
Q
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
EPD&C-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
I. The failure modes of a resistor shorting (e.g. little
or zero resistance) and shorting to ground are not
considered for all resistors in this analysis.
RATIONALE: A shorted resistor will still conduct
current to the connected device. All
Orbiter electrical components An this
subsystem have built-in over-current
protection and will continue to
operate. A resistor shorting to
ground has the same effect as a
resistor opening, that is no current
will be conducted to the rest of the
circuit.
2. The failure modes of most switches, relays, power
contactors, hybrid device controllers and remote power
controllers are either a) fails open or off or b) fails
closed or on. The failure modes a) fails to transfer
or b) inadvertent transfer are specified only when the
controlled subsystem functions would be adversely
effected and specifically cause a higher criticality
rating.
RATIONALE: Criticalities-areassigned based on
hardware and functional effects. The
major percentage of the above
components are doubly or triply,
redundant in hardware and function.
The functional failure of a component
has more weight in determining its_ £
criticality than the hardware failure.
If a switch fails to transfer or
inadvertently transfers, it is either
failed on and closed or failed off and
open.
3. The assumptiqn_stated in 22206 that all other
subsystems are operational Within Specifications is not
used in this analysis where one or more failures in
these subsystems would raise the criticality of the
component analyzed.
RATIONALE: Several subsystems in the Orbiter have
never been or are not planned to be
used in the near future during an
actual flight. Examples include but
are not limited to, the BFS, fuel cell
shutdown and restart, DC bus ties, and
RMS jettison. Criticalities are
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assigned to the components which
supply and control power to these
functions as if they are required.
All components directly related to fuel cell operation
are assigned criticalities based on only one fuel cell
failing.
RATIONALE: The EPD&C/EPG analysis was conducted
under the assumption that two fuel
cells had already failed. Therefore,
the highest criticalities on fuel cell
operations have already been assigned.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written by
Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the item
being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the function. For
each failure mode, the possible causes are outlined, and the
assessed hardware and functional criticality for each mission
phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell Desk Instructions
100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the bottom of each
sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered at the top.
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
i
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR - Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 - Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
APCA - 4
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)
CR!TICALITIES_
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
APCA - 4
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34RPCI
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
5002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A ON)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
APCA - 4
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPE_TIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A ON)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
APCA - 4
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34RPC2
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5004 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
APCA - 4
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34SI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001 .......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS. _ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
APCA - 4
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 54V76A134SI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED ONLY DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #I
APCA - 4
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34AIR55
PART NUMBER: RLR42CI22GM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76B22D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
APCA - 4
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS. A SECOND
FAILURE WOULD REMOVE POWER FROM HELIUM BLOWDOWNVALVES WHICH
WOULD PREVENT PURGING THE AFT COMPARTMENTS OF POSSIBLY EXPLOSIVE
GASSES.
REFERENCES: 76B22C
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31111BG
EPD&C
5008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: _. SCHMECKPEPER SuBsYs _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
B)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
APCA - 4
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TALc
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
C[P]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2200) _.......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE _SS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATHTO THE
APCA. _SSOF_DUNDANCY COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL _ADST_A SECOND
FAILURE WOULD REMOVE POWER FROM HELIUM BLOWDOWNVALVES WHICH
WOULD PREVENT PURGING THE AFT COMPARTMENTS OF POSSIBLY EXPLOSIVE
GASSES.
REFERENCES: 76B22C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5009 ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
APCA - 4
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34FI7
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B22F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5010 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3 _
3/3
LEAD_ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31R2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5i2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B20D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5011 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B19C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMEN_T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR_ 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31R8
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE|
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPE_TIONSI
REFERENCES: 76B16C
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31RI0
RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B13C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
ESS BUS IBC
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31R9
PART NUMBER: RLR42CI22GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: 76BI6B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5015 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31R7
RBR54L20000AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
z
m
REFERENCES: 76B9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IR6
PART NUMBER: RBR54LI4001AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RAT!0NALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B8B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5017 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2 / IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF15
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS. A SECOND
FAILURE WOULD REMOVE POWER FROM HELIUM BLOWDOWNVALVES WHICH
WOULD PREVENT PURGING THE AFT COMPARTMENTS OF POSSIBLY EXPLOSIVE
GASSES.
REFERENCES: 76B19C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI6
ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS. A SECOND
FAILURE WOULD REMOVE POWER FROM HELIUM BLOWDOWNVALVES WHICH
WOULD
WOULD PREVENT PURGING THE AFT COMPARTMENTS OF POSSIBLY EXPLOSIVE
GASSES.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-I, FPCA-I, APCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
CURRENT SENSOR EXCITATION #1,4,7
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-I, FPCA-I, APCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF14
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BI9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/ IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31SI
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO POWER ONE
MAIN DC BUS FROM ANOTHER MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
BUS TIE THE MAIN DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AS
CRITICAL LOADS COULD NOT BE POWERED (I.E. MPS VALVES).
REFERENCES: 76B17C
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5021 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IS 1
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFCT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS TWO TIE BUS CONTACTORS MUST
BE CLOSED BEFORE TWO BUSSES ARE TIED TOGETHER. THE LOSS OF
ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN TWO BUSSES WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS
THE TIE BUSSES ARE FUSE ISOLATED.
m
REFERENCES: 76B17C
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5022 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSY_LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAI_cH: - 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31F26
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5023 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F27
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76B16C
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY_
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5024 ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
37iR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAITNCH: 3/3 .... RTLS: _/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF28
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31S2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF 1/3 OF VEHICLE POWER AND LOSS OF
POWER TO CERTAIN CRITICAL MPS VALVES. BUS TIE CAPABILITY EXITS
TO POWER THE BUS. A FAILURE OF THE BUS TIE POWER SWITCH WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO CRITICAL
MPS VALVES. LOSS OF ALL POWER (REDUNDANCY) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
L_
REFERENCES: 76B14C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
371R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
S)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/!R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
s/IR
3/IR
S/IR
S/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
L
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31S2
MC455-0126-0001 f _t : t =
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL ABILITY TO DISCONNECT FUEL CELLS FROM CRITICAL LOADS
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE'
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF29
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
REFERENCES: 76B12C
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS IBC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS IBC
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR ....
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F31
ME451-0009-5200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO THE ESS
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO
ORBITER ESSENTIAL LOADS RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-30
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F33
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
REFERENCES: 76BIOB
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5030 ABORT:
ITEM: SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R AT-O:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
2/!R
2/i_ .i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31RI 1
PART NUMBER: MSB-501
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER FROM FUEL CELL #I. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL POWER.
A SECOND FAILURE IN THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO MPS HELIUM BLOWDOWN VALVES AND FORWARD RCS ISOL VALVES WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO AN EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE
IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT OR LACK OF CG CONTROL DURING ENTRY.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-32
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA- 1
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC3
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
W REFERENCES: 76BI7E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-33
iINDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
INADVERTENT OPE_TION
_AD _ALYST: K. SC_ECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) GSE PO_R
2) P_-FLT TEST BUS #i
3) MPCA- 1
4) RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/_ ....
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
40V76A25RPC3
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THE_AL ST_SS, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
THIS FAIL_ WOULD CO_ECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC PO_R FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A _CH DE_Y AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON T_ GRO_D.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
3) MPCA - 1
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC4
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER _O THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76BI8E
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
INADVERTENT_OPE_TION --
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
MPCA - 1
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C =_ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: ....5/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC4
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-36
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5035 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-e
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA- 1
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
i
REFERENCES: 76BI4E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SC_ECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
3) MPCA- 1
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC5
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76BI4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA - 1
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC6
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
w
REFERENCES: 76BI5E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-39
k
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1i/87 HI GHEST CRI T ICALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA - 1
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _/3 _
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC6
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND. _
I
I
mm
z
mm
I
i
J
m
m
i
[]
B
m
m
i
m
REFERENCES: 76BISE m
m
mm
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-40
B
m[]
=__
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5039 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
3) MPCA- 1
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN A
5) DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2 CR1
PART NUMBER: JANTXlNII88R
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BITE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #I
3) MPCA- 1
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN A
5) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40 V 76A25A2 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXIN1188R
_ • _IT_ _ i _:#'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI7E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5041 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
3) MPCA- 1
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN A
5) DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:. A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI8E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: I(. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA - 1
DC TIE BUS MAIN A
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SUBSYS LEAD: K- SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ..... ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR2
PART _MBER: JANTXINII88R _ _r_ _....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI8E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA - 1
MAIN DC BUS A F/C POWER
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXlNlI88R
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI4E
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBS¥S LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #I
MPCA - 1
MAIN DC BUS A F/C POWER
DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25A2CR3
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, dERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5045 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
MPCA - 1
MAIN DC BUS A F/C POWER
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI188R
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76B15E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #i
MPCA - 1
MAIN DC BUS A F/C POWER
DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25A2CR4
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........._,_....
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BI5E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
RIA1 PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/iR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
REFERENCES : 76BI7H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 5048 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT TRANSFER
BAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
4) SWITCH, TOGGT._ SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ........ ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI3
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
C_W/VEHICT._. DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5049 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILURE TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS A)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32 V73AIAIS 10
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL COULD NOT BE CONNECTED
TO MAIN DC BUS AFTER A FUEL CELL RESTART.
REFERENCES: 76BI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS A)
INADVERTENT TRANSFERS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS A)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
311R
311R
c[P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI0
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL WAS INADVERTENTLY
DISCONNECTED FROM MAIN DC BUS.
!
B
l
I
I
J
m
mm
mm
i
z
m
i
i
mm
REFERENCES: 76BI4H
l
i
g
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-52
B
wu
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM A/_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5051 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN A CONTR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
013 PANEL
ESS BUS IBC
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN A CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CB2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PATHS TO CONTROL THE
FUEL CELL TO MAIN DC BUS CONNECTION AND THE DC BUS TO BUS TIE
CONNECTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ORBITER SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES: 76BI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN A CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) 013 PANEL
3) ESS BUS IBC
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER,
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
5A THERMAL (MAIN A CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 LRTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CB2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION. IN AN
OVERLOAD CONDITION, MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE. THE OVERLOAD CAN _E
CORRECTED BY VARYING THE LOADING OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES THROUGH
BUS TIES AND OTHER CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
REFERENCES: 76BI9H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5053 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
013 PANEL
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN A CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CR1
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
REFERENCES: 76BI9H
u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
013 PANEL
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN A CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5055 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
013 PANEL
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN A CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-57
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5056 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
013 PANEL
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN A CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AISCB36
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF BACKUP POWER FOR THE CONTROL
OF FUEL CELL POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
u
m
REFERENCES: 76B20G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5058 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI5CB36
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
CBS FOR CONT BUS BCI,BC2,BC3 AND TV AND RADIOS
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI8
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS, OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76C20H
C-61REPORT DATE 03/31/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B7
EPD&C
5060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5- 
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
014 PANEL
CBS FOR SIG COND,MDMS,ACRS,DDUS,LIGHTS,MN C CONTR
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI9
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76C24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5061 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
3) 014 PANEL
4) CBS FOR SIG COND, MDMS,ACRS,DDUS,LIGHTS,MN C CONTR
FUSE, 35A
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF20
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76C24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5062 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os- 
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
ML86B PANEL
CBS FOR GALLEY,WASTE,PYROJETT KU ANT & STBD RMS,EMU, FLOODS
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F21
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76C18H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5063 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
(RCS/OMS HTRS)
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO A6AI PANEL (FUSE 8) & AI4 PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, ISA TO A6AI PANEL (FUSE 8) & AI4 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF22
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO
THE FORWARD RCS HEATERS WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON ASCENT
AND NONE ON ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT ON
ORBIT DEPENDING ON OPERATIONS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76C21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5064 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO MN A CONT BUS PWR, ESS
BUS SOURCE 3AB,ESS BUS SOURCE 2CA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) RIA1 PANEL
4) FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO MN A CONT BUS PWR, ESS BUS SOURCE
3AB,ESS BUS SOURCE 2CA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V 76A3 IF25
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5050
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULDCAUSE THE LOSS OF ONESOURCE OF POWER TO
THREE CONTROL BUSSES AND TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 5065 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RMS PWR (FUSE I),RMS HTRS (RESISTORS)
& RJDA MANF DRS (FUSES 9 & 12)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
3) A8A2 PANEL & 014 PANEL
4) FUSE, 5A TO RMS PWR (FUSE 1),RMS HTRS (RESISTORS) & RJDA
MANF DRS (FUSES 9 & 12)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF34
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO P0_R SOURCES TO
THE RMS. SECOND FAILURE WHILE ON ORBIT TO THE RMS POWER COULD
LEAVE THE ARM IN A POSITION WHERE IT COULD NOT BE JETTISONED.
THIS WOULD PRECLUDE A SAFE ENTRY.
m REFERENCES: 76C23H
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5066 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 32 V73A2 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76C4D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5067 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY 10 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
w
REFERENCES: 76C4D
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C-69REPORT DATE 03/31/87
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: S068 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73A2CR5 _ _ c
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ONE FAILUR_ WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
_HE_INE-CONT_OL-B_S_ESWOUL_CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE _TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76C4D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5069 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR5
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTRQL BUS CIRCUIT IS _FIJRTHER PROTECTED BY 10 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
w
w
REFERENCES: 76C4D
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C-71REPORT DATE 03/31/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5070 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRI_TI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1 R
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR6
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO _._ LOSSO_F__AL_D_ 'POWER T0
THE NINE CbNTRO_. BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DU_T0 _
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76C4D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5071 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAU_NCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY I0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: 76C4D
n
C-73REPORT DATE 03/31/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5072 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
M052J PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73AI24SI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5073 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
014 PANEL
M052J PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 80V73A124SI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76CIF
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5074 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
019 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI9S2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
019 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN A)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AIgS2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76CID
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5076 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN C CONTR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN C CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CB38
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF BACKUP POWER FOR THE CONTROL
OF FUEL CELL POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76Y20G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-78
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5077 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN C CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN C CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CB38
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76Y20G
I.J
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-79
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5078 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CBI0
MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER AT DC UTILITY OUTLETS, WHICH
ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76C24A M
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5079 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o_-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
014 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CBI0
MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION AT DC UTILITY
OUTLETS, WHICH ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76C24A
b
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/Ii/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI5CB62
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
B [P]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO THREE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76C19G
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C-82REPORT DATE 03/31/87
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5081 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A15CB62
MC454-0026-2100
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW MISSION VEHICLE AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76C19G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5082 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB3
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129AIR2
PART NUMBER: RWR80Si2 IIFR
B [ F] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION,=MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76F24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5083 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS CA2
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
w
REFERENCES: 76F24H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5084 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID i)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS CA2
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76F24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5085 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31FII
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
B[F] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76E24G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5086 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
3) FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/Ft_ ............. ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3//3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI2
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5087 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
3) FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31FI3
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76E24G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5088 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A31R4
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI2GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76E23E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5089 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (FMCA-I PWR CONT)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A (FMCA-I PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPCI2
MC450-0017-1050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLEAS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
w
REFERENCES: 76E 2IH
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5090 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (FMCA-I PWR CONT)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A (FMCA-I PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPCI2
MC4S0-0017-1050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO LOADS
ON T_ MCA. SECOND FAILURE TO THESE LOADS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE FORWARD DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5091 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22F6
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
w
REFERENCES: 76E21G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5092 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, I50A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22 F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATH-S-TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5093 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22F8
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS 0F REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76E21G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5094 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO TEST POINTS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO TEST POINTS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
i:
BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AIR75
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO CHECK MAIN DC BUS A. THIS FAILURE WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHIC_ AS ALTERNATE MEANS ARE
AVAI_LE TO THE CREW. _ .............
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5095 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 1.8K TO SIG COND OF1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIR77
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76E8C
C-97REPORT DATE 03/31/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5096 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22F5
PART .........NUMBER: ME451-0009-3035
B[F]
HDW/FUNC
i/1
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO
LOADS CO_EdTED TO--_E---P-CA' _ss OF ALL PO-WER TO THESE LOADS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/MISSION.
DURING AN RTLS, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF FORWARD RCS
MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE 1 WHICH WILL RESULT IN A CG PROBLEM DUE TO
REDUCED DUMP CAPABILITY. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76EIOD
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5097 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS CA2
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129AIR1
PART NUMBER: RWR80S12 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIEDBY GO MCAS. --:SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76E24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5098 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A FWD I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A FWD i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S 1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5099 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A FWD i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A FWD i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76E24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5100 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MPCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 150A TO MPCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF 17
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2100)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES OF
ESSENTIAL BUS POWER ON TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5101 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31R5
RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76F24F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
MPCA-I
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-I) _ _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_/I_C .......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBTT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 . _ .........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPCII
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK_-THERMAL STRESS,--VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-I)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
2/1R AOA: 2/1R
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPCII
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76F21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I05
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
3) FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #1
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF23
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2035 (?3035)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76F7E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF24
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2050 (?3050)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/02 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
m
REFERENCES: 76F7C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i07
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5106 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 150A TO APCA-I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
APCA-4
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34F3
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO LOADS.
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
3) APCA-4
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-I
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/ 3 RTLS: I/1
3/IR TAL: i/1
3/1R AOA: i/1
i/1 ATO: i/I
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34F6
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0100 (?-2100)
C[F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER (MAIN DC BUS A) TO
BOTH HELIUM BLOWDOWN VALVES THAT ARE USED TO VENT THE AFT
FUSELAGE WHICH MAY CONTAIN AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE OF GASSES.
REFERENCES: 76G9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5108 ABORT:
HDW/F_C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO SIG COND OAI)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
APCA-4
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 54V76AI34A3R25
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76G9H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129AIR4
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND ?AILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76H24H
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A AFT I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A AFT i)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73A129S4
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO MCA.
SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CLOSE DOORS AND CONTROL RCS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76H23H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5111 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A AFT i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A AFT 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE BECAUSE
THIS SWITCH IS NORMALLY ON.
!
i REFERENCES: 76H23H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: _. SCHMECK'PEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SC_ECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) APCA-4
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-I) -
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ONE MCA BUS. CRITICAL LOADS ARE
REDU-NDAN_LY _......_ ........._ ..................... = _ _..... LOADSPOWERED. SECOND FAILURE TO ONE OF THESE MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, IF DOOR CLOSURE COULD NOT BE
PERFORMED PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76HI7H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
APCA-4
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76HI7H
C-I15
_ REPORT DATE 03/31/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29AIR3
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76JI6H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 5115 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76JI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5116 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S3
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5117 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
MPCA-I
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPCI2
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
u
REFERENCES: 76J16E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 51i8 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) MPCA-1
4) RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC12
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
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D
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
e)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A135RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L24F
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C-121REPORT DATE 03/31/87
mDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B OFF)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) APCA - 5
4) RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B OFF)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A135RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A135RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L23F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-123
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTO FF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35RPC2
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL ST_SS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35SI
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L23E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5124 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A135S 1
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-5
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [F]
LOCATION: 55V76A135FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE TO DUMP LH2 PRIOR TO DEORBIT. THIS WOULD ALLOW GH2 VENTING
DURING ENTRY WHICH COULD CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH
ATMOSPHERIC 02.
REFERENCES: 76L22C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA- 5
3) FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/ 1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C IF]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35F2
ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/V___TO INANITY T_ _EN _ _2 _ILL _ DRAIN
VALVE TO DUMP LH2 PRIOR TO DEORBIT. THIS WOULD ALLOW GH2 VENTING
DURING ENTRY WHICH COULD CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH
ATMOSPHERIC 02.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-128
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35FI7
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI 35AIR55
PART NUMBER: RLR42CI22GM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76L22D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-130
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32R2
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITI_L FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L76L20D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-131
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIoNs.
REFERENCES: 76L19C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
ESS BUS 2CA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32R9
RLR42CI22GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: 76LI6B
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5132 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R8
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPE_TIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A32RI0
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L13C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-135
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5134 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2K 1/4W (TO C&W)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-_
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R7
PART NUMBER: RBR54L20000AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL S_SS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LgB
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C
MDAC ID: 5135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R6
PART NUMBER: RBR54L14001AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEAS_MENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76L8B
u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32RII
MSB-501
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER FROM FUEL CELL #2. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL POWER.
A SECOND FAILURE IN THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO MPS AND FORWARD RCS VALVES WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO EXPLOSIVE GAS IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT OR LACK
OF CG CONTROL DURING ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F36
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
u
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F35
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASU_MENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 2CA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F34
ME451-0009-5200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO THE ESS
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO
ORBITER ESSENTIAL LOADS RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76L12C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F30
ME451-0016-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F31
ME451-0016-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILUREWOULDCAU_ETHE _S_ O? A REDUNDANTPATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76L17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F27
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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REFERENCES: 76L16C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-144
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hINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS wORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F28
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76L16C
u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-145
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F29
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........................
FIRST FAILUREWO_LD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUND_T_P-ATH_TO'_LLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-2, FPCA-2, APCA-5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
CURRENT SENSOR EXCITATION #2,5,8
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-2, FPCA-2, APCA-5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32FI4
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76LI9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32FI5
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE TO DUMP LH2 PRIOR TO DEORBIT. THIS WOULD ALLOW GH2 VENTING
DURING ENTRY WHICH COULD CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH
ATMOSPHERIC 02.
REFERENCES: 76L19C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F16
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FILLAND DRAIN
VALVE TO DUMP LH2 PRIOR TO DEORBIT. THIS WOULD ALLOW GH2 VENTING
DURING ENTRY WHICH COULD CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH
ATMOSPHERIC 02.
REFERENCES: 76L19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8T
EPD&C
5148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
7 _
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
05-6
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32SI
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO POWER ONE
MAIN DC BUS FROM ANOTHER MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
BUS TIE THE MAIN DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AS
CRITICAL LOADS COULD NOT BE POWERED (I.E. MPS VALVES).
REFERENCES: 76L17C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5149 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 S1
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFCT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS TWO TIE BUS CONTACTORS MUST
CLOSED BEFORE TWO BUSSES ARE TIED TOGETHER. THE LOSS OF
ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN TWO BUSSES WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS
THE TIE BUSSES ARE FUSE ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76L17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-151
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32S2
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL ABILITY TO DISCONNECT FUEL CELLS FROM CRITICAL LOADS
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32S2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF 1/3 OF VEHICLE POWER AND LOSS OF
POWER TO CERTAIN CRITICAL MPS VALVES. BUS TIE CAPABILITY EXITS
TO POWER THE BUS. A FAILURE OF THE BUS TIE POWER SWITCH WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO CRITICAL
MPS VALVES. LOSS OF ALL POWER (REDUNDANCY) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76L14C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-153
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5152 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S2
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF 1/3 OF VEHICLE POWER AND LOSS OF
POWER TO CERTAIN CRITICAL MPS VALVES. BUS TIE CAPABILITY EXITS
TO POWER THE BUS. A FAILURE OF THE BUS TIE POWER SWITCH WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO CRITICAL .
MPS VALVES. LOSS OF ALL POWER (REDUNDANCY) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76Y14C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5153 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DE ORB IT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S2
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFE_ AS THIS IS NORMAL OPERATION.
LOSS OF ALL ABILITY TO DIS C_0__EL_'_CELLS FROM CRITICAL_LOADS
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHIC_. .............
REFERENCES: 76Y14C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-155
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] _
LOCATION: 40V76A33SI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
NO EFFCT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS TWO TIE BUS CONTACTORS MUST
CLOSED BEFORE TWO BUSSES ARE TIED TOGETHER. THE_SS OF
ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN TWO BUSSES WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS
THE TIE BUSSES ARE FUSE ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76Y17C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33SI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO POWER ONE
MAIN DC BUS FROM ANOTHER MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
BUS TIE THE MAIN DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AS
CRITICAL LOADS COULD NOT BE POWERED (I.E. MPS VALVES).
L_-
REFERENCES: 76Y17C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5156 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC3
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-158
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5157 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA- 2
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DIgCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76LITE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-159
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5158 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC4
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-160
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5159 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC4
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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u
REFERENCES: 76LI8E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS oPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2075
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76LI4E I
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-162
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC5
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76LI4E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC6
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC6
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76LISE
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u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA- 2
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN B
5) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 R_LS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI7E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA - 2
DC TIE BUS MAIN B
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THiS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76LI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5166 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA- 2
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN B
5) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
S) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI8E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA - 2
4) DC TIE BUS MAIN B
5) DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CR2
JANTXlNII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI8E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5168 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA- 2
MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40 V 76A26A2 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI4E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-170
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5169 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI4E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5170 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
DIODE, ISO_TION 35A
FAI_ OPEN
_D _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) GSE PO_R
2) P_-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA- 2
4) MAIN DC BUS B F/C P_
DIODE, ISO_TION 35A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ..... ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
40V76A26A2CR4
J_TXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THE_AL STRESS, VIB_TION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GRO_D C/O ONLY _D IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPE_TIONS.
_FE_NCES: 76LI5E
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_PORT DATE 03/31/87 C-172
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 2
MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR
DIODE,ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40 V76A26A2 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76LI5E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5172 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI6CB30
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF BACKUP POWER FOR THE CONTROL
OF FUEL CELL POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5173 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI6CB30
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76L20G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5174 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 2CA
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBI0
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PATHS TO CONTROL THE
FUEL CELL TO MAIN DC BUS CONNECTION AND THE DC BUS TO BUS TIE
CONNECTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ORBITER SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES: 76 L2 OH
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5175 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 2CA
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBI0
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION. IN AN
OVERLOAD CONDITION, MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE, THE OVERLOAD CAN BE
CORRECTED BY VARYING THE LOADING OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES THROUGH
BUS TIES AND OTHER CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
REFERENCES: 76L20H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5176 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN B CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CR3
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN B CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76L19H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5178 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN B CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B [ F] C [ P] _
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA ......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5179 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION i2A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN B CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76LI9H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5180 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE B)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR.
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATI_:::_ ....... _____ ........ _ ......._ .........
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
5181 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE B)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 14
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
m
REFERENCES: 76LI7H
l
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS B)
FAILURE TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISII
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL COULD NOT BE CONNECTED
TO MAIN DC BUS AFTER A FUEL CELL RESTART.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS B)
INADVERTENTLY TRANSFERS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS B)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/ 3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISII
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL WAS INADVERTENTLY
DISCONNECTED FROM MAIN DC BUS.
REFERENCES: 76LI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
z
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS30
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE TO THE AFT PAYLOAD BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PAYLOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5185 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 30
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE TO THE AFT PAYLOAD BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TOPAYLOADS_
REFERENCES: 76LI2H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) APCA-5
APCA-2
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32KI
MC455-0134-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES OF POWER
TO THE AFT PAYLOAD. WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO SUPPLY POWER TO PAYLOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERISUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
APCA-2
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32KI
MC455-0134-0001
CAUSES: MECHSHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAIL_, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76L8F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5188 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: FUSE, 80A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
APCA-2
FUSE, 80A TO AFT P/L MN B
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32F26
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO AFT PAYLOAD
AFTER TWO FAILURES.
REFERENCES: 76L9G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-190
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5189 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 2CA
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 55V76AI32A2R6
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5101GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE EFFECTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76L9G
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-191
JDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
5190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CBS FOR MDMS, SIG CONDS, LIGHTS, ARS, GN&C, MN A CONTR
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32FI9
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76M24H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-192
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5191 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CBS FOR MDMS, SIG CONDS, LIGHTS, ARS, GN&C, MN A CONTR
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: - 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F20
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76M23H
W
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
5192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO RMS PWR & RJDA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
A8A2 PANEL & 015 PANEL
FUSE, 10A TO RMS PWR & RJDA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/!R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F37
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE RMS. SECOND FAILURE WHILE ON ORBIT TO THE RMS POWER COULD
LEAVE THE ARM IN A POSITION WHERE IT COULD NOT BE JETTISONED.
THIS WOULD PRECLUDE A SAFE ENTRY.
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REFERENCES: 76M23H D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-194
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5193 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS PWR MN B, ESS
BUSSES IBC & 3AB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
3AB
s)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS PWR MN B, ESS BUSSES IBC &
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F26
ME451-0009-5050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO
THREE CONTROL BUSSES AND TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSELOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76M21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5194 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO A14 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 15A TO AI4 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F22
ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE_D _AUSE THE LOSS_REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO THE
FORWARD RCS HEATERS WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON ASCENT AND
NONE ON ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT ON ORBIT
DEPENDING ON OPERATIONS REQUIRED.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-196
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
CBS FOR CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3, TV, RADIO, LIGHTS
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32FI8
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76MI9H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8 
EPD&C
5196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
ML86B PANEL
CBS FOR LIGHTS, GALLEY, WASTE, PYRO RMS, ARS
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F21
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76MI8H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-198
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5197 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN B UTIL PWR FI/M013Q)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-e
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN B UTIL PWR FI/M013Q)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI5CB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER AT DC UTILITY OUTLETS, WHICH
ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
w
REFERENCES: 76M24A
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w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-199
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5198 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN B UTIL PWR FI/M013Q)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN B UTIL PWR FI/M013Q)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI5CB9
MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION AT DC UTILITY
OUTLETS, WHICH ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76M24A
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AISCB63
MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO THREE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76MI9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-201
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI5CB63
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76MI9G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-202
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
M013Q PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73A81SII
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
i
REFERENCES: 76M21B
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-203
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
M013Q PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73A81SII
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
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REFERENCES: 76M21B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-204
me
z
ms
uw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
F1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73AISI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76M21A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-205
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEz
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
015 PANEL
F1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73AISI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A2RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND_POSSIBLELOSSOF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76P24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 5206 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5- 
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PP_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76P24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) CONT BUS BC3
3) MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76P24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 FII
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_Izl
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN De BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F12
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76P24G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32FI3
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM_MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C 3 C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R4
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76P23E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPCII
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPCII
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO LOADS
ON THE MCA. SECOND FAILURE TO THESE LOADS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE FORWARD DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76P21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
4) FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F6
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R1 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F5
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76P2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5216 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, I50A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F7
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F4
ME451-0009-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO
LOADS CONNECTED TO THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THESE LOADS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/MISSION.
DURING AN RTLS, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF FORWARD RCS
MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE IWHICH WILL RESULT IN A CG PROBLEM DUE TO
REDUCED DUMP CAPABILITY. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76P8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5218 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO TEST POINTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V 76A23AIR16
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI2GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO CHECK MAIN DC BUS B. THIS FAILURE WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS ALTERNATE MEANS ARE
AVAILABLE TO THE CREW.
REFERENCEs: 76P8G
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5219 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR86
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76P8C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29A2R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S6
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5222 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S6
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CONT BUS BC3
MA73 C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29A2R3
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24G
=
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24F
I
J
l
g
m
m
l
I
llm
m
==
mm
II
I
E
I
w
Q
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-226
g
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S7
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART sTRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76R24F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 2R TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A3R3
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5227 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S8
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76R24E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101 ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/ll/SV
EPD&C
5229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A3RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
B [ F] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
m REFERENCES: 76R24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HI GHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-s
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S9
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
I
M
mm
mm
l
mm
[]
[]
[]
mm
m
[]
m
i
REFERENCES: 76R24D
mm
m
l
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-232
D
I
wm
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS BC3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FiTNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29S9
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32FI7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES OF
ESSENTIAL BUSS POWER ON TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R24C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-234
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5233 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] e[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32R5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76R24B
u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5234 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPCI 1
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPCII
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
=
REFERENCES: 76R22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) MPCA-2
4) RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON: 40V 76A26RPC 10
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLEAS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5237 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) MPCA-2
4) RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPCI0
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76R22G
L_
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 5238 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC22
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5239 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC22
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLEAS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
u
REFERENCES: 76R22E
REPORT DATE 03131187 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC23
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
BC ] c[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLEAS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76R22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5242 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
311R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F23
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2035 (?3035)
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 50A TO H2/02 HTR CONT ASSY #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 F24
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2050 (?3050)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76RI2H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5244 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #4
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTO FF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F25
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2050 (?3050)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76R7H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 55V76AI35F3
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO LOADS.
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS
REFERENCES: 76S24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/1
i/I
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35F6
ME451-0016-0100(?-2100)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO MPS LH2 VALVE SOLENOIDS.
THIS RESULTS IN THE INABILITY TO DUMP RESIDUAL LH2 PRIOR TO
DEORBITWHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO GH2 MIXING
WITH ATMOSPHERIC GO2 WITH A PROBABLE EXPLOSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OA2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35AIR63
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76S8H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-249
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER AS_SS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: S248 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
FAILURE MODE: FAI_*OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BC2
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29A3R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI0
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
THE INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS AND CONTROL RCS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76T23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C ?LIGHT: 3/3
5250 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29SI0
PART_BER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
SWITCH IS NORMALLY ON.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI 35RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ONE MCA BUS. CRITICAL LOADS ARE
REDUNDANTLY POWERED. SECOND FAILURE TO ONE OF THESE LOADS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, IF DOOR CLOSURE COULD NOT BE
PERFORMED PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76TI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5252 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) APCA-5
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 .......ATO: _/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: 55 V 76AI 35RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5253 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIAIIRI
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO A
P/L BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO LACK OF PAYLOAD POWER/CONTROL.
i
REFERENCES: 76U23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-255
w
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIAIIR2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO A
P/L BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO LACK OF PAYLOAD POWER/CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76U22H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-256
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5255 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIAI 0R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO A
P/L BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO LACK OF PAYLOAD POWER/CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76U20H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5256 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-I)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIAIORI
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO A
P/L BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO LACK OF PAYLOAD POWER/CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76UI8H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-258
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5257
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS29
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76U24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH _ TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) o5- 
MAIN DC BUSSES A & B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A[ I] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A!AIS29
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PAYLOAD LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76U24H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-260
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 _
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5259
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS25
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76U20H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5260 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS25
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER PAYLOAD
FUNCTIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76U20H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-262
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5261 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIAI2RI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76U24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5262
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIAI2R2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM suPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
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REFERENCES: 76UI9H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-264
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIAI2R3
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
m
REFERENCES: 76U21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5264 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC20
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE PAYLOAD AUX BUS. WORST CASE EFFECT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-266
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5265 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC20
MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76U23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5266 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
MPCA-I
RPC, ISA TO PAYLOAD CABIN
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC21
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIAI.
REFERENCES: 76U20E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5267
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC21
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER T° P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
REFERENCES: 76U20E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC22
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIAI.
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 FERENCES: 76U20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-270
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC22
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
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REFERENCES: 76U20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORB!TE_ASSESSMENTi
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5270
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, ISA TO PAYLOADCABIN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYSLEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
MPCA-I
RPC, ISA TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC23
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIAI.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SiP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPC23
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
REFERENCES: 76U20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIR9
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI801GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76U24C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AIRI0
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76U24C
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-275
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5274 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 08-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2 CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/L CABIN BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
m_
m
z
B
i
I
D
m
Q
z
m
g
I
I
I
g
I
REFERENCES: 76UI9E
g
w
I
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-276
m
l
wJ
n
w
W
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5275 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25A2CR5
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE P/L CABIN BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI9E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5276 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE P/L CABIN BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-278
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5277 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[p]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILUREWOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/L CABIN BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-279
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5278 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES .......
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C[P] .....
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25A2CR7
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/L CABIN BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5279 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
S) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXlNII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE P/L CABIN BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76U19C
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
s28o
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE P/L CABIN BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76U17C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-282
m
=DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
5281
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CR7
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/L CABIN BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76U17C
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5282 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ......ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... __ .......... _
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/LCABINBU$_ LOSS OF ALL _DUNDANCY_QULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5283 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESs, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE P/L CABIN BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI7D
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-285
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5284 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) OS-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CR5
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE MAIN BUS A AND MAIN BUS B TOGETHER AT THE
OUTPUT OF AN RPC. DEPENDING ON P/L CABIN BUS LOADING, THE RPC
COULD FAIL DUE TO EXCESSIVE REVERSE CURRENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO TH_ P/L CABIN BUSt
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI7F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5285 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os- 
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF SIX SOURCES TO THE
P/L CABIN BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE PROBABLE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LACK OF POWERTO P/L LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UI7F
1
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCITMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, ISA TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPCI9
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIA1.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-288
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPCI9
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I150
B[P] C [ P]
cAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
REFERENCES: 76UI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5288 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V 76A26RPC20
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIAI.
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REFERENCES: 76UI7E I
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-290
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5289 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC20
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
w REFERENCES: 76UI7E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5290 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, ISA TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC21
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RPC IS NORMALLY ON AND THIS FAILURE WOULD KEEP THE P/L
PANELS POWERED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE P/L LOADS BY A
SWITCH IN PANEL RIAI.
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REFERENCES: 76UI7D g
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5291 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC21
MC450-0017-I150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO P/L
PANELS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO INABILITY TO POWER P/L PANELS.
REFERENCES: 76UI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5292 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EM_GENCy BUSSES
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K, SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) MPCA-2
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPCI8
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE PAYLOAD AUX BUS. WORST CASE EFFECT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5293 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPCI8
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76U22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5294 ABORT:
RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26AIR5
RLR07CI801GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76U22C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-296
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5295 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AIR6
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76U22C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-297
INDEPENDE_QR_TER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5296 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (PIL PWR KILL MAIN _B/C)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PAYLOAD EMERGENCY BUS
ESS BUS 2CA
MPCA - 2
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL MAIN B/C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC27
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CUT PAYLOAD
POWER FROM MAIN DE BUSSES B AND C. NO EFFECT UNLESS THE REMOVAL
OF POWER IS REQUIRED, IN WHICH CASE, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76UIIH
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5297 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL MAIN B/C)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
PAYLOAD EMERGENCY BUS
ESS BUS 2CA
MPCA- 2
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL MAIN B/C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] BEP] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC27
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE ALTHOUGH LOSS OF MISSION IS POSSIBLE IF
BACKUP POWER IS NOT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76UI IH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C F-LIGHT: 3/IR _:
MDAC ID: 5298 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN pC DIST ASSY #2
P/L PWR KILL)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: , ,._ _ _ .
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MPCA-2
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 - P/L PWR
KILL)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO KILL
POWER TO THE P/L BAY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO KILL POWER TO P/L BAY LOADS IF
REQUIRED.
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REFERENCES: 76UIIG
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
5299 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
P/L PWR KILL)
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 -
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MPCA-2
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 - P/L PWR
KILL)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE THE P/L BAY POWER KILL REDUNDANT PATHS
TOGETHER CAUSING THE REMOVAL OF MAIN BUS B AND C IF ONE OF THE
MAIN DC BUSSES IS SWITCHED OUT_0M PANEL RIAI. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO THE P/L BAY LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76UIIG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE•
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C ?L_IGHT: 3/2R _
5300 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
P/L PWR KILL)
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 -
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MPCA-2
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 - P/L PWR
KILL)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2 CRI3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE THE P/L BAY POWER KILL REDUNDANT PATHS
TOGETHER CAUSING THE REMOVAL OF MAIN BUS B AND C IF ONE OF THE
MAIN DC BUSSES IS SWITCHED OUT FROM PANEL RIAI.
REFERENCES: 76UIIG
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
5301 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
P/L PWR KILL)
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 -
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MPCA-2
3)
KILL)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 - P/L PWR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26A2CRI3
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO KILL
POWER TO THE P/L BAY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO KILL POWER TO P/L BAY LOADS IF
REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76UIIG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-303
INDEPE_E_ ORBITE_R ASSESSMENT ,
ORBITER SUBSYS__LYSIS WO[_/__
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5302 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO P/L PWR KILL - FC#3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO P/L PWR KILL - FC#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... _
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO KILL POWER TO
P/L BAY FROM FUEL CELL #3. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF P/L BAY POWER IS REQUIRED TO BE TURNED
OFF.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-304
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO P/L PWR KILL - FC#3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO P/L PWR KILL - FC#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27A2CR6
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76UI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5304 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
31iR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
PAYLOAD EMERGENCY BUS
ESS BUS 3AB
MPCA- 3
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC 16
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CUT POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD FROM FUEL CELL #3. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
POWER REMOVAL WERE REQUIRED.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-306
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
PAYLOAD EMERGENCY BUS
ESS BUS 3AB
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPCI6
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO
THE PAYLOAD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76UI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5306 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS26
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH DRIVES A MOTORIZED SWITCH TO CONNECT MAIN DC BUS
POWER TO THE PAYLOADS. REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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REPORT DATE 03131187 C-308
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS26
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH DRIVES A MOTORIZED SWITCH TO CONNECT MAIN DC BUS
POWER TO THE PAYLOADS, REDUNDANT POWE R IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
-- REFERENCES: 76UI3F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5308 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)
FAILS TO TRANSFER .....
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS27
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B[P] C [ P ] _
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A MOTORIZED SWITCH THAT TRANSFERS POWER FROM
FUEL CELL #3 TO PAYLOADS. REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION.
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REFERENCES: 76U13C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-310
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 27
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A MOTORIZED SWITCH THAT TRANSFERS POWER FROM
FUEL CELL #3 TO PAYLOADS. REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76U13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS28
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH DRIVES A MOTORIZED SWITCH TO CONNECT MAIN DC BUS
POWER TO THE PAYLOADS. REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5311 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS28
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH DRIVES A MOTORIZED SWITCH TO CONNECT MAIN DC BUS
POWER TO THE PAYLOADS. REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76UI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-313
INDE_PENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5312
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32S3
MC455-0126-0001
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P] _:
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION .....
_FF_e_S/RAT_o_i
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO
PAYLOAD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO PAYLOAD WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76UIOF m
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-314
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5313 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32S3
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
SWITCH IS NORMALLY CLOSED FOR FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76UIOF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5314 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3),=!
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C .... ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SC_S: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C[ ] ......
LOCATION: 40V76A32RI2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITItAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS. AN
ALTERNATE INDICATOR (TALKBACK) IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76UF
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) ESS BUS 2CA
4) RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32RI3
RWR71SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUITS.
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REFERENCES: 76U9F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-317
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASS_$SME_ NT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3 (PAYLOAD)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3 (PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ _ABORT HDW/_C
3/3 RTLS: 5/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 F39
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150 ........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_• __ ............
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANTPOWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3 (PAYLOAD)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3 (PAYLOAD)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F40
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: 76U9E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SUBsYsTEM_ALYSIS_WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5318 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL _
012 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)
FLIGHT PHASE
P_LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_u'N_-_..............ABORT HDW/_C
3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR _
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73A!2S30
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH TO POWER THE CONTACTOR AFTER THE DC RETURN
PATH HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED WOULD MEAN THAT MAIN DC BUS C LOADS _
WOULD BE LOST. BUS TIE COULD BE PERFORMED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANT POWER TO BUS C LOADS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76U6H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-320
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)
INADVERTENT TRANSFERS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
012 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AI2S30
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH TO POWER THE CONTACTOR AFTER THE DC RETURN
PATH HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED WOULD MEAN THAT MAIN DC BUS C LOADS
WOULD BE LOST. BUS TIE COULD BE PERFORMED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANT POWER TO BUS C LOADS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76U6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5320
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, I50A TO PAYLOAD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
FLIGHT P_E
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/2R AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F41
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION_
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REFERENCES: 76U6E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-322
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5321
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 F42
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76U7E
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5322
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C AB--ORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3 _
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F34
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :_,÷_i_ __
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. _i_ ....._ _
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REFERENCES: 76U4D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-324
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F35
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76U4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-325
INDEP_ENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5324
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD _
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3 _t
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F39
ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE_DUNDANT POWER _OURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-326
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F40
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE PAYLOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO PAYLOADS WOULD PROBABLY
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w
REFERENCES: 76U4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5326
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS WAD: K. SCHMECKPE_ER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE LA_CH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/Y_JNC ....... ABORT
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33RI4
RWR80SI211FR
cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: _
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRiTICAL MEASUREMENT CIR_TS.
REFERENCES: 76U4D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-328
I
mm
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33RI3
RWR71SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: 76U7C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5328
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/_
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECEPEPER SUBSYS_AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FU_C .... ABORT HDW/FUNC
P-RELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANCY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R12
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....._
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS. AN
ALTERNATE INDICATOR (TALKBACK) IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76U8B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5329
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R15
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
ALTERNATE INDICATOR (TALKBACK) IS AVAILABLE.
AN
REFERENCES: 76U8D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/iR
5330 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 0S-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P--_LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 _,
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: _ _i_ii_i_ _
FIRST FAILUREwouLD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC RETURN PATH FOR
POWER CONTACTOR MOTOR. SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE AN INABILITY
TO CHANGE THE POWER CONTACTOR SUPPLYING THE P/L BAY POWER. LOSS
OF ALL CONTROL OF P/L-BAY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
PAYLOAD BAY POWER IS REQUIRED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76USB
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-332
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5331 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXlN1188R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76USB
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTQRBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: . 3/3 _'_
MDAC ID: 5332 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCffMECKPEPER SUBSYSLE_AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 ....
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CR6
JANTXINI188R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHSHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76U5C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
5333 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC RETURN PATH FOR
POWER CONTACTOR MOTOR. SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE AN INABILITY
TO CHANGE THE POWER CONTACTOR SUPPLYING THE P/L BAY POWER. LOSS
OF ALL CONTROL OF P/L BAY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
PAYLOAD BAY POWER IS REQUIRED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76U5C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER s-UBs_YHTEMANALYSI-S-WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3 OUTPUT
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)
......CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT_o HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S3
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO
PAYLOAD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO PAYLOAD WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76U7C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-336
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5335
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
FUEL CELL #3 OUTPUT
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S3
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
SWITCH IS NORMALLY CLOSED FOR FLIGHT OPERATION.
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REFERENCES: 76U7C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5336 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FUEL CELL #3 OUTPUT RETURN
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
z
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C ..... ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
2/1R TAL:
3/1R AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/3
HDW/_C
211R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S4
MC455-0i26-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH TO POWER THE CONTACTOR AFTER THE DC RETURN
_ T HJ{A_--B_ __U_T_ WOq_L _ R_AIT TROT MA I_ D_ BUS _OAD S
WOULD BE LOST. BUS TIE COULD BE PERFORMED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANT POWER TO BUS C LOADS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
A SECOND FAILURE IN THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO MPS AND FORWARD RCS VALVES WHICH CQUDD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO AN EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE IN THE AFT
COMPARTMENT OR LACK OF CG CONTROL DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76U5B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-338
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)
INADVERTENT TRANSFERS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FUEL CELL #3 OUTPUT RETURN
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S4
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MAIN DC BUS C RETURN
PATH AND THE CONNECTED MAIN DC BUS C LOADS. BUS TIE COULD BE
PERFORMED. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO MAIN DC BUS C LOADS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
A SECOND FAILURE IN THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO MPS AND FORWARD RCS VALVES WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO AN EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE IN THE AFT
COMPARTMENT OR LACK OF CG CONTROL DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76U5B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5338 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C TO PAYLOAD)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSyS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 .... = _ _
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C TO PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT.......PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33S5
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001 _ ....
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO
PAYLOAD. LOSS OF A_LL REDUNDANT P_WE_T__WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE _SS O? MISSION. NO E?F_CT ON CREW OR V-E_ICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76U7E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5339 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C TO PAYLOAD)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C TO PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33S5
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
SWITCH IS NORMALLY CLOSED FOR FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76U7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-341
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
5340
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C OFF) ....
FAILS OPEN ....
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) APCA - 6
4) RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C OFF)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
_: 3/3 R-TLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 36RPC 1
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION .................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS, _.... _
REFERENCES: 76Y24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-342
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5341 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C OFF)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A136RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5342
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON) _
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW_/FUN_ .... ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075 i!_!_i_
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION ........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIG_ __E=R_TiONS. _ ......... • __ i_
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REFERENCES: 76Y23F I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY scREENS: A [
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36RPC2
MC450-0017-I075
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76Y23F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-345
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS W__ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ..........ABORT HDW/_C .......
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36SI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76Y23D i
B
mm
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-346
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36SI
MC455-0126-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-347
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5346
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWiFUNC
211R
211R
ITEM: FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-6
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_c ......ABO_T
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FU_C
31ZR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
c [ F ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150(?-2200) _ i_-_ i
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA, ......A__CQ___ _NTHE QTHER_PAT_ WOULDCAUSE LOSS OF
POWER TO_M_PS VK_I _OLENOIDs. iF -_ERTAIN VALVES_RE N_ _CLDEED _"
AT ET SEP, THE ET COULD RECONTACT THE VEHICLE CAUSING TPS DAMAGE
AND OR CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: 76Y22C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-348
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-6
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B [ F] C IF]
LOCATION: 56V76A136F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150 (?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE OTHER PATH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
POWER TO MPS VALVE SOLENOIDS. IF CERTAIN VALVES ARE NOT CLOSED
AT ET SEP, THE ET COULD RECONTACT THE VEHICLE CAUSING TPS DAMAGE
AND OR CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: 76Y22C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIG_:
5348 _ ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) APCA - 6
4) FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A136F17
PART NUMBER: MC451-0009-I003
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y22F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 6
RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36AIR55
RLR42CI22GM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76Y22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-351
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER-+S-tJBSYSTEM ANA_SIS WOi_KS}{EET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5350 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILSOPEN
LEADANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSY S LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FY3Nc ABORT
PRELA£TNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/F_C _
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _+....
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y20D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-352
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5351
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33R3
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
w
REFERENCES: 76Y19C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
suBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5352
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBiT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33R8
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y16C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 323
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33RI0
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
m
REFERENCES: 76Y13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-355
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOi_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_C
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
RED_DANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C ........ ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33R9
RLR42CI22GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPLIES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: 76YI6B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R6
PART NUMBER: RBR54L20000AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y9B
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER _SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKS_IEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5356 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3 =
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 14K I/4W (TO C&W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R7
PART NUMBER: RBR54LI4001AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76Y8B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-358
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33RII
MSB-501
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER FROM FUEL CELL #3. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL POWER.
A SECOND FAILURE IN THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO MPS AND FORWARD RCS VALVES WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO AN EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE IN THE AFT
COMPARTMENT OR LACK OF CG CONTROL DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76Y3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-359
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5358 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ F ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33FI4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE OTHER PATH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
POWER TO MPS VALVE SOLENOIDS. IF CERTAIN VALVES ARE NOT CLOSED
AT ET SEP, THE ET COULD RECONTACT THE VEHICLE CAUSING TPS DAMAGE
AND OR CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: 76Y19C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSiS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
?)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [F]
LOCATION: 40V76A33FI5
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2150(?-2200)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
APCA. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE OTHER PATH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
POWER TO MPS VALVE SOLENOIDS. IF CERTAIN VALVES ARE NOT CLOSED
AT ET SEP, THE ET COULD RECONTACT THE VEHICLE CAUSING TPS DAMAGE
AND OR CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: 76Y19C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5360
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-3, FPCA-3, APCAr6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
CURRENT SENSOR EXCITATION #3,6,9
FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-3, FPCA-3, APCA-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33FI3
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT ON
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REFERENCES: 76YI9B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-362
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11187
EPD&C
5361
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F27
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2200
B [ F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76Y16C
l
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_T
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5362 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS _
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYS_T: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LA_CH: 3/3 RT--LS: 3/IR _
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 F28
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl!
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT PATH TO ALLOW
BUS TIE OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL PATHS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED.
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REFERENCES: 76Y16C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-364
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5363 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A (NO LOAD CONNECTED)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 10A (NO LOAD CONNECTED)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F36
ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS FUSE HAS NO LOADS CONNECTED TO IT.
REFERENCES: 76Y15C
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 3AB _ -
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 3AB
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUN_ ABORT qTDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/iR
3/3
A[2 ] B [F] C[P]
40V76A33F31
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5200 ...................
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....... _....... _/
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO THE ESS
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO
ORBITER ESSENTIAL LOADS RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76Y12C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5365 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F32
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
REFERENCES: 76Y12C
=
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-367
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
suBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5366
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
P_EIIAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F33
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
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REFERENCES: 76YIOB
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-368
mi
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5367 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN C CONTR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) 013 PANEL
3) ESS BUS 3AB
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN C CONTR)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBI6
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PATHS TO CONTROL THE
FUEL CELL TO MAIN DC BUS CONNECTION AND THE DC BUS TO BUS TIE
CONNECTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ORBITER SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES: 76Y20H
=
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-369
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIG_:
5368 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3_
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN C CONTR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 3AB
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN C CONTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: .... 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANcY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CBI6
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3 _
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION. IN AN
OVERLOAD CONDITION, MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE, THE OVERLOAD CAN BE
CORRECTED BY VARYING THE LOADING OF THE MAIN DC BUSSES THROUGH
BUS TIES AND OTHER CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
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REFERENCES: 76Y20H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-370
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5369 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 15
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
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REFERENCES: 76YI7H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-371
m7NDEPENDENT ORB!_TE__RAS SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
5370 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI5
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A BUS TIE WERE REQUIRED, THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL MPS VALVES.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-372
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5371
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)
FAILURE TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI2
ME452-0102-7355
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL COULD NOT BE CONNECTED
TO MAIN DC BUS AFTER A FUEL CELL RESTART.
REFERENCES: 76YI4H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5372 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENTLY TRANSFERS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7355
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FUEL CELL WAS INADVERTENTLY
DISCONNECTED FROM MAIN DC BUS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5373 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS31
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE TO THE AFT PAYLOAD BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES: 76YI2H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-375
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5374 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAi PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC -_
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
LO CAT I0N:
PART NUMBER: __ _ .....
32V73AIAIS31
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE TO THE AFT PAYLOAD BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES: 76YI2H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
APCA-3
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33KI
MC455-0134-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES OF POWER
TO THE AFT PAYLOAD. WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO SUPPLY POWER TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES: 76Y8H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENTORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5376
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
APCA-3
RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33KI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0134-0001 _ _
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5377 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO AFT P/L MN C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
APCA-3
FUSE, 80A TO AFT P/L MN C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33FI3
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO AFT PAYLOAD
AFTER TWO FAILURES.
REFERENCES: 76Y9 G
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5378 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) APCA-3
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 0S-6
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/9
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33A2R5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5101GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE EFFECTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76Y9G
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5379 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76YITE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5380
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (_C_TIE BUS MAIN C)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECEPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA- 3
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5381 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPC4
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76YI8E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5382 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
B)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPC4
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76YI8E i
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-384
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5383 ABORTz
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPC5
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76YI4E
°
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYsTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST:K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA- 3
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PlqELAT/NCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPC5
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76YI4E I
l
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-386
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5385 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA- 3
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPC6
MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF A POWER CONTACTER
USED TO CONNECT DC POWER TO THE MAIN DC BUS. THE WORST CASE
EFFECT IS LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
REFERENCES: 76YI5E
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B7
EPD&C
5386
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC6
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CONNECT/DISCONNECT MAIN DC POWER FROM THE MAIN
DC BUS. THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY AS THIS RPC IS
USED ONLY ON THE GROUND.
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REFERENCES: 76YI5E I
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-388
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5387 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
DC TIE BUS MAIN C
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27A2CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5388 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
DC TIE BUS MAIN C
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
THIS CIRCUIT IS U_ FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND iS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI7E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-390
D
I
mu
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5389 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
DC TIE BUS MAIN C
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76Y18E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5390 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
DC TIE BUS MAIN C
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
] BE ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI8E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-392
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCH ECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5392 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
_D ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAp: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA - 3
MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27A2CR3
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI4E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-394
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5393 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
MPCA - 3
MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27A2 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YI5E
W
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5394 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD _ALYST: _K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LE_D: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA - 3
4) MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEOR_STT" 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27A2CR4
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ .... i _i
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76YISE
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-396
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5395 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
CBS FOR MDMS, SIG CONDS, GN&C, ARS, LIGHTS
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33FI9
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AA2 4H
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-397
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS M_ENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_ °W_RKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
_PD&C
5396
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
?LIGHT: 3/iR
ABORT: 3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) 016 PANEL
CBS FOR MDMS, SIG CONDS, GN&C, ARS, LIGHTS
FUSE, 35A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3 / IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F20
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AA23H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5397 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO RJDA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO RJDA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F37
ME451-0009-5050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO ONE FORWARD DRIVER
LATCHING RELAY. SINCE THE RELAY IS LATCHED ON DURING PRELAUNCH
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AA23H
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-399
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5398 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO AI4 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 _ _ ....
FUSE, 15A TO AI4 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F22
ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS A REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO THE
FORWARD RCS HEATERS WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON ASCENT AND
NONE ON ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT ON ORBIT
DEPENDING ON OPERATIONS REQUIRED.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-400
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5399 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS MAIN C, ESS
BUSSES IBC & 2CA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
2CA
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS MAIN C, ESS BUSSES IBC &
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V 76A33 F26
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5050
B IF] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO
THREE CONTROL BUSSES AND TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AA2 IH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
0RBiTER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
NO CONNECTION ON
DWG #76AA
FUSE, 35A _
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEOI_BIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33FI7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AA21H I
I
I
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-402
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
CBS FOR TV, RADIO, LIGHTS, CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33FI8
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AA21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-403
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORB ITER SUBSYSTEM _KNALYSI S WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EpD&c
5402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
37i 
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
ML86B PANEL
CBS FOR LIGHTS, WASTE, EMU, RMS, PYRO JETT
FUSE, 35A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DE ORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F21
ME451-0016-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILUREWOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES TO MAIN DC
SUB-BUSSES IN FLIGHT DECK PANELS. OTHER PANELS WILL STILL BE
ABLE TO CONTROL FLIGHT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO _BILITY TO
POWER AND CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AA20H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-404
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5403 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN C UTIL PWRA11/A15/M030F)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN C UTIL PWRAll/A15/M030F)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI6CB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION AT DC UTILITY
OUTLETS, WHICH ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AA23A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5404 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN C UTIL PWR AII/AIS/M030F)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN C UTIL PWR All/A15/M030F)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI 6CB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER AT DC UTILITY OUTLETS, WHICH
ARE NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
mm
m
i
[]
ms
m
mm
mm
i
m
w
B
B
REFERENCES: 76AA23A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-406
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5405
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS AB1, AB2, AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI5CB64
MC454-0026-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AAI8A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-407
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EP_C -FLIGHT: 3/IR
5406 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3)_ _
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
a)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI5CB64
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2100
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO THREE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AAI8A
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CRI
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76AAI6A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-409
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB1)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB1)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 32V73A2CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF coNTRoL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY i0 A CIRCUIT
BREA_R. THE N_T RESUTT IS NO EFFECT.
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REFERENCES: 76AAI6A
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5409 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32 V73A2 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY i0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: 7 6AAI 6A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-411
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5410 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR2
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EF?ECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5411 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR3
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
w REFERENCES: 76AAI6A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-413
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5412 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY I0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-414
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5413 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
AI5AI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI5AIS2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
=
REFERENCES: 76AA3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
AI5AI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTI_ PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AISAIS2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH_0VIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/M_SSION/VEH_C_.
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REFERENCES: 76AA3H
J
J
m
g
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
M030F PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73AI23SI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76AA3F
t
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 08-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
M030F PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73AI23SI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AA3F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-418
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5417 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
ALIA1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI IAIS 13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76AA3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-419
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
FAILS C_SED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
016 PANEL
ALIA1 PANEL
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI IAIS 13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PiECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO A NON-CRITICAL UTILITY OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-420
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29A4RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
=
REFERENCES: 76AC24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5420 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLESPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29SII
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION. ...........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
5421 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73A129SII
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES : 76AC24 H
r
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYS!S WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, ISOA TO FPCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40 V76A33 F 11
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0150
B [F] C [ P]
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76AC24G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-424
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5423 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33FI2
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM MAIN DC
DIST ASSY TO FPCA. LOSS OF ALL PATHS TO FORWARD MAIN DC BUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AC24G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5424 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R4
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AC24E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5425
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (FMCA'3 PWR CONT)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A (FMCA-3 PWR CONT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24RPCI2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLEAS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AC21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-427
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5426 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (FMCA-3 PWR CONT )
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A (FMCA-3 PWR CONT)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C[ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPCI2
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO LOADS
ON THE MCA. SECOND FAILURE TO THESE LOADS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE FORWARD DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76AC21H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5427 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUM BER:
83V76A24F4
ME451-0009-3035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE TO
LOADS CONNECTED TO THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THESE LOADS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/MISSION.
DURING AN RTLS, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF FORWARD RCS
MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE 1 WHICH WILL RESULT IN A CG PROBLEM DUE TO
REDUCED DUMP CAPABILITY. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76ACIOD
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5428 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO TEST POINTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIRI3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO CHECK MAIN DC BUS C. THIS FAILURE WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS ALTERNATE MEANS ARE
AVAILABLE TO THE CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V 76A24AIR73
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AC8C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-431
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS W_RKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
S430
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-_
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A4R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AD24H mm
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-432
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5431 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A4R3
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AD24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5432
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. sECOND?AILU_ COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUSALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AD24H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-434
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5433 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI2
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AD24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/Ft[NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/!R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI3
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE
MCA. SECOND FAILURE COULD DISABLE THE MCA BUS ALTOGETHER. LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS ON
ENTRY AND THEREBY CAUSING DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AD24F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-436
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5435 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S 13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AD24F
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w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYS_IS - W-OI%K--SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5436
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33FI6
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RAT!ONALEI
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE SOURCES OF
ESSENTIAL BUSS POWER ON TWO ESSENTIAL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER
TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-438
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33R5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NON-CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AD24C
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_ WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5438
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #i
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ........ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/!R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F23
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2035 (?3035)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-440
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5439 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5- 
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 F24
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2035 (?3035)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH sHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
_=
REFERENCES: 76ADI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5440 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 50A TO H2/02 HTR CONT ASSY #4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F25
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-2050 (?3050)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO H2/O2 CONTROL
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CRYO CONTROL AND
ALL EPS CONTROL WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL HEATER LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AD9B mm
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-442
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5441
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) MPCA-3
4) RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPCI0
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AD2 IH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5442 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) MPCA-3
4) RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPCI 0
PART NUMBER" MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5443 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPCII
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSESi PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AD21F
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-445
INDEPENDENTORBITERASS_SSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/8V
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5444
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DE OR-_T: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPCI 1
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO MCA
FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE IN OTHER PATH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS DURING ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5445 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IRR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36F3
ME451-0016-0150
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO LOADS.
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS
REFERENCES: 76AE24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-447
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5446 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PREI_U_CH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
I/i
i/i
i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36F6
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0100 (?-2100)
C [ F ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO MPS VALVE SOLENOIDS. IF
CERTAIN VALVES ARE NOT CLOSED AT ET SEP, THE ET COULD RECONTACT
THE ORBITER CAUSING TPS DAMAGE AND/OR DESTRUCTION OF THE
VEHICLE/CREW.
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REFERENCES: 76AETH
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-448
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5447 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO SIG COND OA3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OA3)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36AIR63
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AE7H
=
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-449
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5448 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA2
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29A4R4
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO MCA BUS. CRITICAL
ITEMS ARE SUPPLIED BY TWO MCAS. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS RESULTING IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
VEHICLE ON ENTRY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AF24H g
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-450
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5449 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C AFT 3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
CONT BUS CA2
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C AFT 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI4
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT DC POWER TO MCA.
SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CLOSE DOORS AND CONTROL RCS/OMS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76AF23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5450 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C AFT 3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) CONT BUS CA2
3) MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C AFT 3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29SI4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
SWITCH IS NORMALLY ON.
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REFERENCES: 76AF23H !
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_ SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_/_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5451 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 56V76A136RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
B IF] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ONE MCA BUS. CRITICAL LOADS ARE
REDUNDANTLY POWERED. SECOND FAILURE TO ONE OF THESE LOADS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, IF DOOR CLOSURE COULD NOT BE
PERFORMED PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76AFI7H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-453
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5452 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36RPC24
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AFITH
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5453 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA4RI
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE. CREW/VEHICLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS
BUSSES IS LOST DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
i
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REFERENCES: 76AK24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5454 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 & #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS4
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK24H,21H, IIF
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-456
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5455 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 & #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
B [ F] C [P]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT MAIN
DC BUS POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AK24H,21H, IIF
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS W0_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5456 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA4R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE. CREW/VEHICLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS
BUSSES IS LOST DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AK21H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-458
I
I
=i
w
n
w
I
L
w
W
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5457 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA4R3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76AK20G
.
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5458 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 1)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7303
BC ] cC ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AKI9F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5459 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C i)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO THE
ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
m REFERENCES: 76AKI9F
W
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-461
INDEPEnDEnT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5460 ABORT:
HDW/FTJNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
32V73AIAIATRI
RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT. NO EFFECT
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76AKI8F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5461
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8E I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26AIR2
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5462 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A26AIR7
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_ONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK22B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5463 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AK24B
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-465
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5464 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILLE MODE:
DIODE, ISO_TION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS 1BC)
SHORTS
_AD _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI P_L
DIODE, ISO_TION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
40V76A26AICRI
J_TXV IN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THE_AL STRESS, VIB_TION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISO_TION BETWEEN THE VEHIC_ _D GRO_D
CIRCUITS _D IS NON-CRITICAL D_ING FLIGHT OPE_TIONS.
_FERENCES: 76AK24B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-466
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5465
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26AICR2
JANTXV IN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK23B
u
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-467
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5466 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILS OPEN
LE.A_ ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPE_PER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK23B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5467 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #i - ESS BUS IBC
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #I - ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-Ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AK23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5468 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #i - ESS BUS IBC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #i - ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPCI
MC450-0017-2100 (?-ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CONNECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK23B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5469
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #i - ESS BUS IBC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #i - ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AK21D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-471
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5470 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #I - ESS BUS IBC
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST- K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #I - ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
313
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CO_ECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK21D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5471 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A27AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
] BC ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK20C
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-473
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5472 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) MPCA-3
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A27AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK20C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5473 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 1BC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIA1 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27AICR3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AK2 ID
v
W
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-475
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5474 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 1BC)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27AICR3
JANTXV IN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISOLATION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND GROUND
CIRCUITS AND IS NON-CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AK21D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5475 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC - GROUND C/O
2) MDM LF1
3) DIODE, BLOCKING
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-477
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5476 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ESS BUS IBC - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27AICR4
JANTXV1N4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AK22D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5477 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
FUEL CELL #i
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
RIA1 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AKI9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-479
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR/_S_
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/1i/8v
EPD&C
5478
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ZSOU_TION 3SA (ESS BUS ZBC)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3_
3/3
LEAD ANALyST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #1
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31CR1
PART NUMBER: JANTXINl188R .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5479
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULDHAVEN0-EFFECT AS AN RPCINSERIES WOULD BLOCK
REVERSE CURRENT UP TO 12 AMPS..
REFERENCES: 76AKI9A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-481
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5480 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 ICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AKI9A
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5481 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 ICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
B [ F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AKIgA
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5482 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALIT!ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31CR3
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS AN RPC IN SERIES WOULD BLOCK
REVERSE CURRENT UP TO 12 AMPS..
REFERENCES: 76AKI9A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-484
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5483 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS IBC)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #I
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIA1 PANEL - ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 ICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-485
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
5484 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #i
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIA1 PANEL - ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 ICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
CRITICAL LOADS AND CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-486
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5485 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I019
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AKI8A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-487
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5486 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #i
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F29
ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5487 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
FUEL CELL #i
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31F30
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AKI9G
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5488
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3 =
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: : -- .............
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5489 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, ISA TO APCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 1BC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A31F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
B [F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AKI6A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5490 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FUSE, 5A TO H2/02 CONT BOX #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F6
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO LOADS CONNECTED TO THIS FUSE.
J
J
B
I
B
lib
P
D
r_
I
I
REFERENCES: 76AKI5H
l
I
I
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-492
I
Bm
nm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5491 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100 (?1005)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO CRYO
LOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CRYO LOADS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AKI5H
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-493
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5492 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FUSE, ISA TO MPCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F3
ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5493 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FUSE, 10A TO H2/02 CONT BOX #4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IF5
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100 (71005)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO LOADS CONNECTED TO THIS FUSE.
M
REFERENCES: 76AKI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-495
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5494 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-I & FLCAI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-I & FLCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A31F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL ONE AC BUS
INVERTER SET. LOSS OF ALL INVERTER SETS CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL AC POWER GENERATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5495 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO RI5 PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 10A TO RI5 PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31FI0
ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO C & W PANEL
AND ONE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER AND
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AKI2H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5496 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 ....RTLS: 3/IR-
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A31F4
ME451-0009-I019
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-498
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5497 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO ESS IBC MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO ESS IBC MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A3 IRI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO TEST THE ESSENTIAL BUS IBC. THIS FAILURE
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS ALTERNATE TEST
MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLETOTHE CREW,
w
REFERENCES: 76AKI8A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5498 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS !BC)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34RPC3
MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5499 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
APCA-4
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC 3 c[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76A134RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AKI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-S01
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5500 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS IBC VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS IBC VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] CC ]
LOCATION: 54V76A134AIR22
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
REFERENCES: 76AK16C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-I (MPS)
FAILURE MODEz FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
APCA-4
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-1 (MPS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34FI0
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL SOURCES TO
THE LO2 PREVALVE IN ONE ENGINE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNCANCY WOULD
LOSE THE VALVE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BY
EXPLOSION OR LOSS OF CG MANAGEMENT ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76AK16C
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-503
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5502 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI34CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AKI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-504
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5503 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
2) APCA-4
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AKI6D
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5504 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-506
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5505 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
APCA-4
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC cC
LOCATION: 54V76AI34CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AKI6D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5506 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS ON
_AD _ALY_ST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
ALCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
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REFERENCES: 76AKI6F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-508
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8_
EPD&C
5507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
APCA-4
ALCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY,
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
REFERENCES: 76AKI6F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS IBC TEST POINT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS IBC TEST POINT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AIR74
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76AK12C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-510
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
5509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BCI
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29A5R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE
OMS/RCS DC BUS. THE SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE BUSS.
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED OFF OF TWO BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CONTROL RCS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76AK4F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WOi_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5510 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLESPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYSLEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
RCS/OMS BC BUS
CONT BUS BCI
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S 16
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE OMS/RCS
DC BUS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE THE BUS. LOSS OF ALL RCS/OMS
DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT A
CROSSFEED OF PROP IS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76AK4F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5511 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
RCS/OMS BC BUS
CONT BUS BCI
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI6
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK4F
L
L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5512 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE OMS/RCS BUS. SECOND FAILURE TO OTHER SOURCE WOULD LOSE THE
BUS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN A PROP CROSSFEED
SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK6E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-514
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/0MS BC BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-515
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
AMCA-2
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 55V76AII5CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AK6C I
E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-516
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5515 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
AMCA-2
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 55V76AIISCRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
B IF] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, IT WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK6C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5516 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS) .....
SHORTS
LEAD ANA_LYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
AMCA-2
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AII5CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, IT WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK5C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-518
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5517 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
AMCA-2
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 55V76A115CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AK5C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMEC_KPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL ....
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1 & #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 37iR _
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS5
ME452-0i02-7301
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT MAIN
DC BUS POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AM24H, 2IH, 1IF
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1 & #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS5
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM24H,21H, IIF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-521
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K, SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LE_: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA5RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE.
CREW/VEHiCLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS BUSSES IS LOST
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AM24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5521 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIASR2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE. CREW/VEHICLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS
BUSSES IS LOST DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AM21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5522
HIGHEST cRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/ a C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4 _
FAILS OPEN
LEAD _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 08-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32 V73 AIAIA5R3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76AM20G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-524
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5523 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA8RI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76AMI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER-SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5524 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
4) SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 2)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS8
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO THE
ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5525 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIA1 PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS8
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5526 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA - GROUND C/O
MDM LF1
DIODE, BLOCKING
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM 23 B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5527 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THiS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-529
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5528 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISOLATION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND GROUND
CIRCUITS AND IS NON-CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AM24B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-530
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA'3 - ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
w
REFERENCES: 76AM24B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-531
wINDEPEND_NTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31111B7
EPD&C
5530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEADANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD" K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) MPCA-3
4) RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
_= CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAL_NCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AIR1
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM22B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-532
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AIR2
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
w
REFERENCES: 76AM22B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS _Wo_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5532 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPCl
MC450-0017-2100 (?-1100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5533 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A27RPCI
MC450-0017-2100 (?-1100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CONNECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM23B
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5534 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, !0A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) MPCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-536
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5535 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-Ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
_m MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CONNECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM2 ID
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5536 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYSLEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_E_IIA_D_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM20C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-538
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5537 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
_)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-539
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
5538 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AICR3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-540
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5539 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AICR3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISOLATION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND GROUND
CIRCUITS AND IS NON-CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AM21D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5540 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AICR4
JANTXV IN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM22D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-542
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5541 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AICR4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AM22 D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
5542 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
SUBSYS LE_AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
1) FUEL CELL #2
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 2CA)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR i_
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
CRITICAL LOADS AND CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-544
J
TINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5543 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FUEL CELL #2
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 2CA)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9H
jIF___
r_
J
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-545
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIG_:
MDAC ID: 5544 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
DIODE, ISO_TION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
T._AD _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS T._AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
MPCA-1
DIODE, ISO_TION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
40V76A32CR3
J_TXlNII88R
CAUSES: CO_INATION, THE_AL ST_SS, VIB_TION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS AN RPC IN SERIES WOULD BLOCK
_VERSE _NT UP TO 12 _PS.
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_FE_NCES: 76AMI9A
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_PORT DATE 03/31/87 C-546
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/B7
EPD&C
5545
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
CRITICAL LOADS AND CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5546 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
CRITICAL LOADS AND CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AMI9A i
l
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-548
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5547 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
MPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS AN RPC IN SERIES WOULD BLOCK
REVERSE CURRENT UP TO 12 AMPS.
REFERENCES: 76AM 19A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-549
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5548 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) FUEL CELL #2
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A32 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-550
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5549
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os- 
FUEL CELL #2
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
CRITICAL LOADS AND CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-551
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER-SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5550
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
FUEL CELL #2
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F32
ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-552
U
[]
uDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5551 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #2
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F33
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AMI9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-553
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5552 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 7.5A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I019
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AMI8A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-554
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32FI
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
REFERENCES: 76AMI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-555
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5554
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 15A TO APCA-5
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-5
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE| .....
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AMI6A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-556
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5555 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 5A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 5A TO H2/02 CONT BOX #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F6
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO LOADS CONNECTED TO THIS FUSE.
REFERENCES: 76AMI5H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-557 C- "7
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5556 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100 (?1005)
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT P0_R TO CRYO
LOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CRYO LOADS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AMISH
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-558
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: S557 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-_
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F3
ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
i
REFERENCES: 76AMI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-559
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5558 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-2 & FLCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 2CA
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-2 & FLCA-2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT:" 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I005
:7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL ONE AC BUS
INVERTER SET. LOSS OF ALL INVERTER SETS CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL AC POWER GENERATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AMI3H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-560
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vINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5559 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO 013 & RI5 PANELS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 10A TO 013 & RI5 PANELS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A32 FI0
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO C & W PANEL
AND ONE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER AND
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AMI2H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5560 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32F4
ME451-0009-I019
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-562
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5561 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO ESS 2CA MONITOR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO ESS 2CA MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A32RI
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO TEST THE ESSENTIAL BUS 2CA. THIS FAILURE
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS ALTERNATE TEST
MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW,
REFERENCES: 76AMI8A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-563
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5562 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA TEST POINT)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA TEST POINT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIRI5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AM12C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-564
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
5563
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A122ARI89
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
REFERENCES: 76AMI6F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-565
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5564 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI22ARI89
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
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REFERENCES: 76AMI6F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-566
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5565 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35RPC3
MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5566 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) APCA- 5
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A135RPC3
MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-568
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5567 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI35CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-569
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/5
MDAC ID: 5568 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI35CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-570
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5569
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-571
INDEPENDE_NT QRBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 55V76A135CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AMI6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-572
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5571 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-5
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A135AIR1
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O O_- NO EFFECT ON-FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AM16C
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5572 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-2 (MPS)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-2 (MPS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: 55V76A135FI0
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL SOURCES TO
THE LO2 PREVALVE IN ONE ENGINE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNCANCY WOULD
POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF THE VALVE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE BY EXPLOSION OR LOSS OF CG MANAGEMENT ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76AM16C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-574
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5573 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS CA1
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: 85V73A129A5R3
PART NUMBER: RWR80S12 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE
OMS/RCS DC BUS. THE SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE BUSS.
CRITICAL_CTIONSARE PERFO_EDOFFOFTWOBUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CONTROL RCS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76AM4F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
5574 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
RCS/OMS CA BUS
CONT BUS CA1
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI7
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE OMS/RCS
DC BUS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE THE BUS. LOSS OF ALL RCS/OMS
DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT A
CROSSFEED OF PROP IS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76AM4G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-576
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5575 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
RCS/OMS CA BUS
CONT BUS CA1
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI7
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM4G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOI_<SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5576 ABORT:
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
LEAD ANALYST; K- SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI 36RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE OMS/RCS BUS. SECOND FAILURE TO OTHER SOURCE WOULD LOSE THE
BUS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN A PROP CROSSFEED
SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM6G
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5577 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM6G
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-579
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5578 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
3) APCA-4
AMCA-3
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AII6CRI
JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AM5E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5579 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
APCA-4
AMCA-3
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO" 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION: 56V76AII6CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, IT WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM5E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-581
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA- 6
AMCA-3
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B IF] C [P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AII6CR2
JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, IT WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AM6E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-582
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5581 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
AMCA-3
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56 V 76AI 16 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
w
REFERENCES: 76AM6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-583
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYsTEM ANALYSIS WOP._ET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5582 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
AMCA-I
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 54V76AII4CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
z
I
D
M
ii
I
I
REFERENCES: 76AP6E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-584
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5583 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
AMCA-I
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 3 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 54V76AII4CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, IT WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP6E
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5584 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9) os- 
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
APCA-4
AMCA-I
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATI ON: 54 V 76AI 14 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE" _ .............._ __ _ :_ ..............._q _-__._ ____ i:_:_:__i :i
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER,_ICH, _
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON RCS/OMS B_S LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, I! WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO TWO OMS/RCS
BUSSES. THE NEXT FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE
RCS/OMS BUS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL PROP VALVES DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP3E
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-586
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO@.KSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5585 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
APCA-4
AMCA-I
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [PP ]
LOCATION: 54V76A114 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, vIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES TO THE
OMS/RCS BUS. NEXT FAILURE TO THAT BUS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER
TO PROP VALVES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING A
CROSSFEED SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP3E
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-587
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5586 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
APCA-4
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
THE OMS/RCS BUS. SECOND FAILURE TO OTHER SOURCE WOULD LOSE THE
BUS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN A PROP CROSSFEED
SITUATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP6G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-588
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5587 ABORT:
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
_ 2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) APCA-4
4) RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
--_ 5)
- 6)
7)
__ 8)
_ 9) o5-6
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
-- PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
_ ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
_ DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
L_
w
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
c [ ]
54V76AI34RPC23
MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
-- EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
w
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REFERENCES: 76AP6G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5588 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
RCS/OMS AB BUS
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAU_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] c[p]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29SI5
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE OMS/RCS
DC BUS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE THE BUS. LOSS OF ALL RCS/OMS
DC BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT A
CROSSFEED OF PROP IS REQUIRED.
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REFERENCES: 76AP4F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-590
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5589 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
RCS/OMS AB BUS
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29SI5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP4F
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-591
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/sv
EPD&C
5590
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB3
MA73C PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29ASRI
RWR80SI21iFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE
OMS/RCS DC BUS. THE SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE BUSS.
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED OFF OF TWO BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CONTROL RCS VALVES.
REFERENCES: 76AP4F
I
llm
HI
m
==
i
U
g
mm
U
l
m
D
u
I
am
J
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-592
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5591 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 3AB TEST POINT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 3AB TEST POINT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AIRI2
RLR07C512GR (?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED IN A NON-CR!TiCALMEASUREMENT CIRCUIT. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AP12C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5592 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO ESS 3AB MONITOR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO ESS 3AB MONITOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33RI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED TO TEST THE ESSENTIAL BUS 2CA. THIS FAILURE
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS ALTERNATE TEST
MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW,
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REFERENCES: 76API8A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-594
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5593 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76API9A
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5594 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIA! PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
REFERENCES: 76API9A
m
z
l
i
I
B
D
z
g
m
i
i
m
m
m
J
l
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-596
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5595 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: .... 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CR2
JANTXIN1188R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS AN RPC IN SERIES WOULD BLOCK
REVERSE CURRENT UP TO 12 AMPS.
REFERENCES: 76API9A
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-597
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5596 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) MPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76API9A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-598
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5597 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CR3
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
i
REFERENCES: 76API9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-599
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5598
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBiT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS AN RPC IN SERIES WOULD BLOCK
REVERSE CURRENT UP TO 12 AMPS.
REFERENCES: 76API9A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-600
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5599 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 3AB)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CR4
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS ANOTHER ISOLATION DIODE IN
SERIES WOULD BLOCK REVERSE CURRENT.
REFERENCES: 76API9H
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-601
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5600 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33CR4
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE AS TWO OTHER SOURCES FOR THE ESS BUS
EXIST. NOT READILY DETECTABLE IF ANOTHER SOURCE IS POWERING THE
ESS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LOSE CRITICAL LOADS AND
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76APIgH
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-602
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 3AB
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F29
ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHiCLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76API9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-603
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
S602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 3AB
FAILS OPEN '
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
FUEL CELL #3
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F30
ME451-0009-5100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PATH FROM THE FUEL CELL
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT PATH AND POWER SOURCES ARE
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76API9G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-604
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5603 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDw/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F2
ME451-0009-I019
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE BACKUP GPC USED BY THE
BFS WHICH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF BFS WERE
REQUIRED..
REFERENCES: 76API8A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-605
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5604 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKP_PER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F1
PART NUMBER: MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...............
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT
CIRCUIT. ALTERNATE MONITORS AND INDICATORS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
CREW.
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REFERENCES: 76API7A
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-606
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5605 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AP16A
r •
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 5A TO H2/02 CONT BOX #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F5
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO LOADS CONNECTED TO THIS FUSE.
REFERENCES: 76APISH
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11187
EPD&C
5607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-5100 (?1005)
cAusEs: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO CRYO
LOADS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CRYO LOADS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76API5H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-609
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5608 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A33 F3
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS SUPPLIED THROUGH THE PCA. LOSS OF ALL ESSENTIAL BUS POWER
TO THESE LOADS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5609 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-3 & FLCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-3 & FLCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F7
ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL ONE AC BUS
INVERTER SET. LOSS OF ALL INVERTER SETS CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL AC POWER GENERATION.
REFERENCES: 76API3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-611
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HI GHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5610 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO 013 PANEL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FUSE, 10A TO 013 PANEL
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33FI0
ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO C & W PANEL
AND ONE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER AND
CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-612
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5611 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT : 2/ IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A33F4
ME451-0009-I019
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO PANELS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE BACKUP GPC USED BY THE
BFS WHICH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF BFS WERE
REQUIRED..
REFERENCES: 76APIIH
u
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-613
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5612 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI23ARI89
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
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REFERENCES: 76API6F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-614
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5613
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
s)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI23ARI89
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND CHECKOUT ONLY.
OPERATIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
REFERENCES: 76API6F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-615
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5614 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 36RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76API6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-616
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5615 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2150
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GSE C/O ONLY AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76API6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C'617
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5616 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76API6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-618
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
"DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5617 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36CRI
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76API6D
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-619
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5618 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76API6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-620
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5619 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI 36CR2
JANTXINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76API6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-621
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5620 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SISTOR, 5.1K
FAI_OPEN
T._AD _ALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMEC_EPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE PO_R
P_-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
_SISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION: 56V76AI 36AIR22
P_T _MBER: R_07C512GR (?)
MUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIB_TION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GRO_D C/O ONLY.
OPE_TIONS.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT
_FE_NCES: 76AP16C
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5621 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-3 (MPS)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-3 (MPS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI36FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL SOURCES TO
THE LO2 PREVALVE IN ONE ENGINE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
LOSE THE VALVE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BY
EXPLOSION OR LOSS OF CG MANAGEMENT ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76AP16C
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-623
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5622 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS9
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCE
TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
IF THE BFS WERE REQUIRED AND THIS BUS WAS LOST, LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: 76API9F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-624
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5623 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
373
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS9
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP 19 F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-625
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5624
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W TO MDM OF4
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA9RI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
m
mm
mm
mm
I
mR
m
ms
mm
I
I
I
REFERENCES: 76AP20G
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5625
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W TO MDM OF4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA6R3
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 76API8F
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5626 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA6R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE.
CREW/VEHICLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS BUSSES IS LOST
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AP24H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5627 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
B)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA6RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
B[F] c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT
ONE MAIN DC BUS TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS. REDUNDANT POWER IS
AVAILABLE.
CREW/VEHICLE LOSS IS CERTAIN IF ALL POWER TO ESS BUSSES IS LOST
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER ALL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AP21H
_J
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-629
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5628
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN A/B)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1 & #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS6
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL TO CONNECT MAIN
DC BUS POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL
LOADS.
IF THE BFS WERE REQUIRED, THE LOSS OF ESSENTIAL BUS 3AB WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AP24H,21H, IIF
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-630
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5629 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN A/B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i & #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32 V73AIAIS 6
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP24H,21H, IIF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-631
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5630 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-1 - ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISOLATION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND GROUND
CIRCUITS AND IS NON-CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AP24B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-632
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
5631 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-1 - ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/_IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
w
REFERENCES: 76AP24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-633
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5632 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUN C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP23B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-634
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5633 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB - GROUND C/O
2) MDM LFI
3) DIODE, BLOCKING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION: 40V 76A25A 1CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-635
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5634 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AIR2
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AP22B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5635
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8X 1/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
MPCA-I
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO- 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIR1
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-637
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5636
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25RPCI
MC450-0017-2100 (?-1100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AP23 B m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5637 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
MPCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON: 40 V 76A25RPC 1
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?'1100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CONNECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP23B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5638 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
FAILS ON
LEAD_ALYST:K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o_-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26RPC2
MC450-0017-2100 (?-1100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........ _ .....
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE ESSENTIAL
BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS,
REFERENCES: 76AP2 ID
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-640
l
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER S_BSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5639
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MDCA #3 - ESS BUS 3AB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100 (?-ii00)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE MAIN
DC BUS FROM THE ESSENTIAL BUS. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE THE
MAIN DC BUS IS NORMALLY CONNECTED TO THE ESSENTIAL BUS DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP2 ID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-641
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5640
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES : 76AP20C
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-642
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5641
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
MPCA-2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26AIR4
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORINGFUNCTION THAT iS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AP20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-643
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/il/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5642
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB - GROUND C/O
2) MDM LFI
3) DIODE, BLOCKING
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ .....
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP22D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-644
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5643 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB - GROUND C/O
MDM LFI
DIODE, BLOCKING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS ONLY USED DURING GROUND C/O AND IS NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76AP22D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-645
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5644 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS 3AB)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR ISOLATION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE AND GROUND
CIRCUITS AND IS NON-CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AP21D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-646
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MINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
5645 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (TOM"PCA-2 - ESS BUS 3AB)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
s)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE SOURCE TO THE ESS BUS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO THE INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AP2 ID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5646 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #2
APCA - 5
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35F9
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS22G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-648
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5647 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ALCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) APCA-5
4) FUSE, 10A TO ALCA-2
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI35F7
ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-649
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5648 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA-2
4) FUSE, 5A
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26FII
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76ASI8G
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-650
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5649
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) MPCA-2
4) FUSE, 15A
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26 F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS16H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-651
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET g
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3 ..
MDAC ID: 5650 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 5A
imFAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN •
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPERLEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER z
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2 --
3) FPCA-2 "
4) FUSE, 5A
5)
6) ..
7)
8)
9) os-6 =
qm
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 u
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23F19
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS8H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5651 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FPCA-3
4) FUSE, 5A
5)
6)
7)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24 F 10
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS7D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5652 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
3) FPCA-I
4) FUSE, 5A
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22FI0
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS4C
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g
m
w=
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5653 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 15A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
3) MPCA-1
4) FUSE, 15A
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25F9
ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76ASIIC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-655
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5654 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #I
3) MPCA-1
4) FUSE, 5A
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25FI0
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76ASI4B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5655 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 15A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
MPCA-3
FUSE, 15A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USE FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76ASI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-657
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
APCA-6
FUSE, IOA TO ALCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI36F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I005
B [ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: 76AS22E
w
l
m
I
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-658
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A TO ALCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
3) APCA-4
4) FUSE, 10A TO ALCA-I
5)
4)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI34F7
ME451-0009-I005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
i
REFERENCES: 76AS22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-659
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5658 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MQN!TOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLT TEST BUS #1
APCA-4
FUSE, 3A TO GSE MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI 34F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........... ......
THIS cIR_IT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76AS22B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5659 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS l)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFI._G: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A18 A_',7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261- .%002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SH,_CK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O 0 TLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT19F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-66]
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5660 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS I)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2 :
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (iNHIBIT BUS i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AISAR7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATI9F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-662
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5661 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR6
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT21F
w.
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR6
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT21F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-664
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5664 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8AR8
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFE_NCES: 76ATI8F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-666
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5665
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATIIF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-667
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5666 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7AR8
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATIIF
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-668
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5667 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 1)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR7
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-669
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5668 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS i)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7AR7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATI2F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-670
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5669 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7AR6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT14F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-671
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5670 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR6
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATI4F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-672
I
D
wL,.
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5671 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6AR7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-673
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5672 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS I)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR7
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76ATSF
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-674
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5673 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR6
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT7F
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-675
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5674 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (INHIBIT BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR6
MC477-026i-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT7F
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-676
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5675
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
FLCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A16AR8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT4F
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-677
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5676 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3 -
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #I
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (RESISTANCE TEST BUS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8IV76AI 6AR8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76AT4F
I
l
_B
i
B
im
me
J
i
mm
m
i
m
B
I
z
J
=__
B
Rmm
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-678
i
i
nm
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5677 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI
ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE THREE MAIN DC
BUSS SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL SOURCES MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL
LOADS.
n
REFERENCES: 76AU24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-679
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5678 ABORT:
HDW/FL_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWRMN A)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7102
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AU24H
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5679 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32 V73AIAIS2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7102
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE THREE MAIN DC
BUSS SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL SOURCES MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL
LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI7H
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM........ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5680 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGG_ (CONTROL BUS PWR MN B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] - _ _ -
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS2
ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AUI7H
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5681 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWRMN C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS 3
ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE THREE MAIN DC
BUSS SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL SOURCES MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL
LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-683
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5682 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE (CONTROL BUS PWR MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AUIOH
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-684
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5683
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: _
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
RESISTOR/ i.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES AB & CA RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES AB & CA RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIAIRI
RWR71SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO TWO
CONT BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-685
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5684
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES AB & BC RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIA1 PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES AB & BC RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA2RI
PART NUMBER: RWR71SI2 IIFR
B[F] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANTPOWER TO TWO
CONT BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-686
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5685 ABORT: 3/1R
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES CA & BC RESET)ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT BUSSES CA & BC RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA2R2
RWR71SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS ITEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO TWO
CONT BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-687
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5686 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-1 (CONT BUS PWR)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-1 (CONT BUS PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8IV76A22 F27
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-1021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES TO
SIX CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AU23G
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5687 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & AB1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
FPCA-1
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & AB1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC1
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5688
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & ABI
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-_
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & ABI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 8IV76A22RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AU23D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5689 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & AB2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & AB2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC2
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU21D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-691
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5690 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & AB2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s) 0s-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & AB2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC2
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5691
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & AB3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & AB3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76A22RPC3
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
w
REFERENCES: 76AUI9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-693
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5692 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & AB3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & AB3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
m
m
m
mm
l
I
m
e
m
U
B
mm
I
==_
E
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5693 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[1] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 81V76A22CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
i REFERENCES: 76AU23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-695
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5694
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22CRI
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES.
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-696
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5695 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
c[p]
LOCATION: 81V76A22CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMO_VEONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-697
RINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
5696
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
31ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8IV76A22 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOI_RCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-698
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5697 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8iV76A22 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
-- REFERENCES: 76AU20D
°L
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-699
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5698 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
3) FPCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU20D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5699 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8 iV76A22 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU21D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-701
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5700 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
37iR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8iV 76A22 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONA _ :
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE RED_DA_ SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-702
L
E
mm
wm
r_
N
==
w
= •
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/iR
5701 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8iV76A22 CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-703
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP_S_
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5702 ABORT: 3/iR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22CR5
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5703 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 8 iV76A22 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-705
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS I_ORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5704 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 8iV76A22 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-706
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5705 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CONT BUS ABI & CA1
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIRI
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-707
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5706 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD- K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS AB2 & CA2
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AIR2
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE|
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU20D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5707 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB3 & CA3
2) FPCA-1
3) RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF1)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8iV76A22AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-709
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5708 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4w (TO SIG COND OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & CA1
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W (TO SIG COND OFi)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AIR35
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT cRITIcAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU22D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-710
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5709 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & CA1
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22AIR36
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-711
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5710 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS AB2 & CA2
FPCA- 1
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AIR37
PART NUMBER: RLR07Ci82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU20D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-712
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5711 ABORT: 3/3
RESISTOR,
FAILS OPEN
1.8K 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS AB2 & CA2
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIR38
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-713
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER S_BS-YSTEM ANALYSI_ =WoRKS_ET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5712 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONT BUS AB3 & CA3
FPCA- 1
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAtq_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22AIR39
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NoT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5713 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK i/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-e
CONT BUS AB3 & CA3
FPCA- 1
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIR40
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUI8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-715
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIB WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5714 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA1 & ABI)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA1 & ABI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 8IV76AI 6ARI
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TOREMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-716
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5715 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA1 & ABI)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
3) RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA1 & AB1)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8IV76AI 6ARI
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-717
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5716 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA2 & AB2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA2 & AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6AR2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AU21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-718
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5717 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA2 & AB2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA2 & AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ii ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR2
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES : 76AU2 IF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER :S_BSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5718 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA3 & AB3)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA3 & AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI?TOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFiGURATiON.
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REFERENCES: 76AU19F mm
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-720
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5719 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA3 & AB3)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
3) RIAI PANEL
FLCA- 1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS CA3 & AB3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8IV76AI 6AR3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI9F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-721
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5720 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BCI & ABI)
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC1 & AB1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARI
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILUREWOULD CAUSE THE INABILITYTO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECTON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLESINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AUI7F mm
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-722
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5721 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC1 & ABI)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BCI & ABI)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARI
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-723
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5722 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & AB2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
B)
s)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE i (CONT BUS BC2 & AB2)
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
cRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
373 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR2
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5723 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & AB2)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR2
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-725
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBS_EM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5724 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & AB3)
FAILS ON -
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) RIA1 PANEL
4) FLCA-2
5) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & AB3)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7AR3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5725 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & AB3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI2 F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-727
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5726 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC1 & CA1)
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BCI & CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AISARI
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/ii/8 
EPD&C
5727
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BCI & CA!)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BCl & CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU9F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-729
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5728 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & CA2)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AISAR2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5729 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & CA2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC2 & CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR2
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-731
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5730 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & CA3)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8AR3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM TWO
CONTROL BUSSES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THIS IS
THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5731
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & CA3)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS BC3 & CA3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-733
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5732 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-2 (CONT BUS PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-2 (CONT BUS PWR)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23F32
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE PO_R SOURCES TO
SIX CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5733 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BCI & ABI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BCI & ABI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 82V76A23RPCl
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-735
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8_
EPD&C
5734
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BCI & ABI
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BCI & ABI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-736
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5735 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2 & AB2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2 & AB2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/iR
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC2
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-737
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5736 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2 & AB2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2 & AB2
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION,
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5737 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3 & AB3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3 & AB3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC3
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI2D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-739
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5738
ITEM: RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3 & AB3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLO_E_ _ ....................
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3 & AB3
05-6
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/5_
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC3
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5739 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATI ON: 82 V76A23 CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI6D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-741
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE-R_S-UBSYSTEM ANALYS I_ WT_KSHEET
DATE" 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5740 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI6D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5741 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEADANALYST:K. SCHMEC PEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/ IR AOA: 3/IR
DE ORBIT: 3/ IR ATO : 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TwoCONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-743
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORESHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 ....
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5742
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN .......
HDW/FUNC
3/iR-
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/1R
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5743 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 82V76A23 CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-745
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5744 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI3D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5745 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23CR4
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUI4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-747
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5746 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 82 V76A23 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI4D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-748
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5747 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-749
ms
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 5748 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/ii/87
EPD&C
5749
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ iR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-751
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ....
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5750 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LE_AD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ i] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: 82V76A23 CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5751 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR19
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES'. 76AUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-753
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSES SMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5752 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS AB2 & BC2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_CH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AIR20
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THISFUNCTION IS NQ_IT_C__AL_TO=VEH!CLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AUI3D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5753 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS AB3 & BC3
FPCA- 2
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR21
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
w
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-755
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5754 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5- 
CONT BUS ABI & BCl
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR51
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUI5D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5755
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORTz
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR52
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUI5D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-757
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5756 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB2 & BC2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS" 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AiR53
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL _Q
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AUI3D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-758
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5757
ITEM: RESISTOR,
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
1.8K i/4W (TO DC RETURN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS AB2 & BC2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR54
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-759
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1 I/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5758 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB3 & BC3
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR55
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS iTEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-760
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5759 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: X. SCHMEC_PEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMEC_PEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB3 & BC3
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AIR56
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AUIID
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-761
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5760 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR48
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AU4D
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J
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-762
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5761 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AIR47
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
w
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-763
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5762 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24AIR46
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-764
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER- SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_ W_P.KSHEET
DATE: 3/Ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5763 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR45
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-765
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8T
EPD&C
5764
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO DC RETURN)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
FPCA- 3
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO DC RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24AIR44
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-766
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5765
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1,8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
_)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
FPCA- 3
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR43
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A MONITORING FUNCTION THAT IS NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT/VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-767
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5766 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR17
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-768
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5767 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
FPCA- 3
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AIRI6
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-769
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5768 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-_
CONT BUS CA1 & BCl
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AIRI5
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MONITORING OF THIS FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE
OPERATION AND ALTERNATE MONITORS ARE AVAILABLE.
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REFERENCES: 76AU8D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-770
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5769
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R
ABORT: 3/ 1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTO FF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24CRI
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-771
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118 
EPD&C
5770
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-772
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5771 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT -HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI20_RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/_7 C-773
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5772 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 =
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCAT ION: 83 V 76A24 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU8D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5773 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _-_ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24CR3
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-775
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5774
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLTG_:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
SHORTS
_AD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 83 V 76A24 CR3
PART _MBER: JANTXINI204_
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THECONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-776
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOq_KSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5775 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION: 83V76A24 CR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-777
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5776 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST" K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24CR4
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU6D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-778
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5777 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24CR5
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-779
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5778 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL _ ....
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/ii/8v
EPD&C
5779
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 3 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24CR6
JANTXIN1204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO MAIN DC BUSSES TOGETHER, WHICH
MIGHT CAUSE AN RPC FAILURE DEPENDING ON CONTROL BUS LOADING. IF
THE RPC OPENS, THIS WOULD REMOVE ONE SOURCE FROM TWO CONTROL
BUSSES. IF ALL REDUNDANT SOURCES TO THE CONTROL BUS ARE LOST,
THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-781
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5780 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SOURCE TO A
CONTROL BUS. AFTER THREE FAILURES THE CONTROL BUS WOULD BE LOST
AND SOME CRITICAL LOADS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHIC_.
REFERENCES: 7 6AU4 D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5781 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPCI
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-783
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5782 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1 & BCI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24RPCI
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION, ......
REFERENCES: 76AU9D
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-784
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5783 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPC2
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AU7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-785
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5784 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2 & BC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON: 83 V 76A24 RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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REFERENCES: 76AU7D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5785 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83 V76A24RPC3
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS RPC WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT
SOURCES TO TWO CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL
BUSSES WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
w
REFERENCES: 76AU4D
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-787
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5786 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3 & BC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPC3
MC450-0017-2050
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5787 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-3 (CONT BUS PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
FUSE, 5A TO FLCA-3 (CONT BUS PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ l] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24FI2
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES TO
SIX CONTROL BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCE S: 76AU9G
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-789
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5788 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO P/L RETENTION LATCHES SYS 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI
A6AI PANEL
FUSE, 1A TO P/L RETENTION LATCHES SYS 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 36V73A6AIFI
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDENT POWER TO P/L
RETENTION LATCHES. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF THE PAYLOAD HAD TO BE RELEASED PRIOR TO DEORBIT.
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REFERENCES: 76AVI3H
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-790
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5789 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO P/L RETENTION LATCHES SYS 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BCI
A6AI PANEL
FUSE, IA TO P/L RETENTION LATCHES SYS 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73A6AIF2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDENTPOWER TO P/L
RETENTION LATCHES. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF THE PAYLOAD HAD TO BE RELEASED PRIOR TO DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: 76AVI5F
w
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-791
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5790 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS ABI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS ABI
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2F83
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AW7H u
J
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-792
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5791 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2F84
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AWI5G - NOT SHOWN
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-793
EINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5792 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DIST ASSY #3
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 F85
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AV7F B
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-794
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5793 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BCl
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BCl
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DE ORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3 / 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: 32V73A2F86
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AY22F
m
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-795
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5794 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DIST ASSY #I
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2F87
ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs .........
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/I1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5795 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DIST ASSY #i
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS BC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2F88
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
w
REFERENCES: 76AV4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-797
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5796 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA1
mm
mm
I
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I
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I
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2F89
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-i021
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ;_
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
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REFERENCES: 76AWIIC - NOT SHOWN
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-798
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5797 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DIST ASSY #2
R15 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : All] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2F90
ME451-0009-1021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH shocK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76AY21B - NOT SHOWN
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-799
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5798 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DIST ASSY #2
R15 PANEL
R2 PANEL
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS CA3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32 V73A2 F91
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF THREE POWER SOURCES
TO ONE CONTROL BUSS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL
CRITICAL LOADS.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-800
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5799 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A TO MMCA-1 & 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB1
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
m
REFERENCES: 76BC14H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-801
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5800 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-I & 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-I & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2FI6
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ................
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-802
J
g
mi
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPDIC
5801
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A TO MMCA-2
FAILS OPEN
T._.AD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS T._AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CONT BUS BCI
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_NDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2F5
P_T _MBER: ME451-0018-0100
B IF] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
C_W/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4G
i
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-803
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5802 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS BC2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) FUSE, 1A TO MMCA-2
4)
S)
6)
7) .
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2F27
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-804
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